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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DESERET LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
IRA B. SHARP and LOIS C. SHARP, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
HOWELLS LIVESTOCK, INC., 
a corporation, 
Intervener a.nd Respondent. 
Case No. 
7368 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and plaintiff sets forth as its statement of 
facts the following: 
The plaintiff Deseret Livestock Company is a Utah 
corporation organized and doing business under and 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah since 1891, 
and succeeding to the interests of a number of individuals 
who had operated in the same manner for many years 
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prior to 1891 (Tt. P. 575) This Company has lands in 
Rich County, in eastern Utah, which comprise spring, 
summer and autumn grazing for its sheep, and in western 
Utah, Tooele County, it has located other lands and grazing 
rights, which comprise its winter grazing. Twice each 
year this Company historically has moved its sheep from 
one range to the other, the movement in the spring from 
the winter grazing lands in Tooele County to its Summer 
lands in Rich County, and the movement in the fall being 
from Rich County lands to the Tooele County lands. 
(Tr. P. 8) 
The general movement of the sheep from the winter 
lands to the summer lands in the spring takes place during 
the month of April, and in the fall, in the latter part of 
November. 
In Tooele County the Deseret Livestock Company 
has its main ranch located at the old Hawaiian settlement 
of Iosepa, which locality is approximately sixteen miles 
south of Highway 40 as it crosses the tip of the Stansbury 
Mountains, and said ranch is located at the west foothills 1 
of the said Stansbury Range. Between the ranch at losepa 
and the point of the mountain at Highway 40 the Deseret 
Livestock Company has purchased and leased considerable · 
acreage along the west foothills of the Stansbury Range, 
which are in close proximity to or are crossed by the pre-
sent county highway as it proceeds north and south through . 
Skull Valley. Along this stretch of sixteen miles are a 
number of springs which are located within approximately .. 
a half mile of the said highway. This area is illustrated j 
by the following map: 1'-
1 
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Particularly the lands of the plaintiff corpGration 
within this area are owned or leased in the following man-
ner: In Township 1 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, which comprises the four miles im-
mediately south from Highway 40; the lands in Sections 
16 and 32 are owned by and a.re in the name of the State 
of Utah but are being purchased under contract by Thomas 
Jeremy and are leased by the Deseret Livestock Company 
from Jer,emy. This is likewise true of the East Half of 
the East Half of Section 29; Northwest Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 29; East Half of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 20, and the Southwest Quarter of the 
West Half of the Southeast Quarter, and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 21. This area is 
shown on the plat in diagonal lines northwest by southeast. 
Transcript Page 594 
The following lands are owned in fee by the Deseret 
Livestock Company and Ethan Jeremy and have had 
patent issued for less than twenty years as of the date 
of the filing of the complaint: All of Section 36, Township 
2 South, Range 8 West, and all of Section 2, Township 
3 South, Range 8 West; Southwest Quarter of the South-
east Quarter of Section 29, Township 1 South, Range 
7 West; Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 7 West, and Lot 
1, Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 7 West. These 
lands are shown on the plat by diagonal lines southwest by 
northeast. Exhibit # 10, 11 and 9 of Defendants. 
The lands above described, and particularly those 
located within the area four miles south of Highway 40, 1 · 
I 
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5 
have been leased and purchased by the plaintiff company 
to provide a source of feed and resting ground to permit 
the plaintiff Company to hold its sheep while it is loading 
on to the trains and shipping from Timpie Point, a loading 
station on the Western Pacific Railway at the north tip 
of the Stansbury Range. As shown by the evidence, the 
sole value of the land is for its feed. (Tr. P. 15) 
Defendants Ira B. Sharp and wife formed a partner-
ship under which they purchased the sheep of the Howells 
Livestock, Inc., the partnership having by purchase re-
ceived title to a number of sheep representing seventy-
five per cent., and the corporation retaining twenty-five 
percent. of the sheep; this purchase having been made 
shortly after the death of David Howells in 1939. (Tr. P. 
415) The trespasses herein complained of commenced 
several years after the Sharps took over. (Tr. P. 13) 
Skull Valley in Tooele County, Utah is a typical desert 
waste, bounded by the Stansbury Mountains on the east 
and Cedar Mountain on the west, and is approximately 
fifteen miles in width, and extends from Great Salt Lake 
on the north and south in excess of forty or fifty miles. 
Except for the Deseret Livestock Company ranch at Iosepa, 
where a comparative few acres of improved land are fenced, 
there does not appear any evidence that any of the other 
land in the en tire valley is fenced except a small acreage 
around Muskrat Springs and Burnt Springs, the latter 
being two of the springs heretofore mentioned as within 
close proximity to the county highway through Skull 
Valley. (De£. Ex. 5) 
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The Sharp and Howells Livestock Inc. interests have 
their winter range at Dugway and Trout Creek, in South-
western Tooele County and their rights extend over into 
Nevada. The winter range of the Deseret Livestock Com-
pany covers all of Skull Valley, and is located particularly 
in the south and west part of Skull Valley on what is known 
as ((Cedar Mountain". (Tr. P. 63) 
In the spring the sheep of the Deseret Livestock 
Company are brought east from the west part of the 
valley to losepa, and then trailed north up the east side 
of Skull Valley in the general area of the county road, to 
the shipping point at Tim pie (a Western Pacific yard at 
the north tip of the Stansbury Range). (Tr. P. 63) 
The Howells Livestock, Inc. and Sharp interests trail 
from the area to the south and west of Skull Valley and 
proceed north through the valley, and from losepa north 
they have historically followed the county road from 
losepa to Timpie Point, being along the same course as 
that followed by plaintiff. At the Deseret Livestock 
Company ranch at losepa, this county road is bounded 
~I 
on either side for a half mile by fences, with the width 
between the fences approximately 100 feet (P. 93 of 
Neff deposition) ~~~ 
In 1946 Sharp had been advi~ed where the Deseret 
Livestock Company lands ~ere located, and Sharp had 
been told to stay below the present county highway with 
his sheep where necessary to avoid these lands. (Tr. P. 13) 
In 1947 the herders for Sharp, and Sharp himself, were 
told to keep their herds below this county highway, and 
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to stay off the land of plaintiff. (Tr. P. 13; P. 55) The 
herders were told by Sharp, nevertheless, to stay out of 
the greasewood. (Tr. P. 55) Because of the fact that 
the Sharp herders under instructions held their sheep back 
and actually fed and bedded them upon the land which 
the plaintiff Company was reserving for its herds, this 
action was brought to enjoin this threatened continued 
trespass. 
The defendants and intervener by their counter-
claim (Par. 12) asserted a right to trail their animals over 
a ((well-defined trail and roadway in common with other 
members of the public, which trail is in excess of 15 0 feet 
wide and is situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, 
and more particularly described in Exhibit B attached 
hereto and hereby referred to and made a part hereof." 
Par. 15 of the counterclaim further asserts that said 
tttrail and roadway and Burnt Spring were in existence at 
the time the plaintiff's lands were public domain, and that 
the said trail and roadway were at that time a public high-
way and used by the public generally for the purpose of 
trailing sheep." 
In the prayer of the cross-complaint the defendants 
ask that rr said trail and roadway be found to be a public 
grazing livestock in the area, or, in the alternative, that., 
~: such trail be found to be a private easement vested in 
Howells Livestock." 
In Exhibit B attached to that complaint the trail and 
roadway is described in general course through various 
sections without any particularity as to the roadway and 
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without connection by metes and bounds to any corners, 
and without locating the roadway other than it is said to 
be within a certain section. 
In Par. 14 of the complaint in intervention the inter-
vener describes the same general course of the claimed trail 
as it is described in the defendants' Exhibit B. However, 
there is attached to the complaint in intervention a docu-
ment marked ((Exhibit C," upon which is located in dotted 
lines the claimed trail or roadway, with the trail beyond the 
dotted lines to be evidenced by the present county high-
way. 
The trial of this cause extended over several days, and, 
as shown by minute entry of July 16, 1948 (R. 86), both 1 
parties on the 16th day of July, 1948, rested, with the 
plaintiff being granted permission to reopen the case for ;11 
the purpose of placing of record its patent to the property, ~~ ~,'ll 
whereupon uthe matter was by court taken under advise- ·• 
ment." :rJ 
On October 4, 1948, the intervener filed a motion to 
amend its complaint in intervention and reopen its case 
to show a survey of the road. This motion appears on Page 1 ~ 
87 of the record, and in that the intervener claims the ! fll 
trail covered all of the property of the plaintiff heretofore we 
described which is located between the new county road 
and the foothills to the east for the purpose of trailing 
and grazing its sheep, and by which use since prior to 1911, 
the intervener claims an easen~ent in gross to trail across 
the property and to graze 14,000 of its sheep on the pro-
perty by trailing between the county road and the foothills ( 
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on the east, and thereby asserting a right to trail and graze 
on all the lands of the plain tiff in this area, under assertion 
of an easement in gross. 
At the time of the hearing on this motion the Court 
permitted the amendment over the objection of plaintiff, 
and permitted the defendants and intervener to intro-
duce testimony of a survey of a purported course which 
the Court had walked over a portion of the area and which 
was entirely different from any course testified to by any 
witness in the trial. (Tr. P. 522, 690, 610, 606) 
In its judgement the lower court found that there 
exists a public road 100 feet wide, and the center line of 
that road is particularly described; that the road is in 
existence and had never been abandoned; that the inter-
vener had a prescriptive right to trail 11,000 sheep and to 
graze the same along the described trail for a public road 
during the spring and fall, and to spread the sheep along the 
course of the public road from the grease woods on the 
west to the foothills on the east, to a total width of approxi-
mately 3000 feet; that the plaintiff had no right, title 
or interest in and to the waters of Burnt Spring; that 
the intervener had established a right by prescription to 
water 11,000 sheep at Burnt Spring, and to spread them 
,~ over a width of 500 feet on each side of the spring to a 
point 800 feet distant from the headwater. That inter-
-~ venor had a prespective right in addition to trail and graze 
all of Sect. 36 T 2 S. 8w and Sect. 2 T 3S. R. 8W. 
The Court denied any injunctive relief to the plaintiff 
-· and denied recovery for any damages resulting from tres-
:\· passing. 
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The history back of the traveled roads in Skull Valley 
is best reflected in plaintiff's ((Exhibit A", which is a map 
or plat of this area taken from the official files of the re-
corder's office of Tooele County, Utah, and stipulated as 
being part of its official records. This map was prepared 
for Tooele County by T. K. Ward, Engineer, and it shows 
the various roads and trails as they existed in Tooele County 
prior to 1920. The roadway which appears in the lower 
righthand part of the exhibit and extends south along the 
west edge of the Stansbury Range represents the old Lincoln 
Highway, and the present new or county roadway is not 
shown on that exhibit. The exhibit had been prepared 
prior to the time that road was constructed. No alternate 
road or trail running north and south appears on that map. 
The Court will notice on this exhibit that a number of 
old trails are indicated upon the plat in dotted lines. This 
old road was the old Lincoln Highway, and it still carries 
the old sandstone markers which were erected as part of the 
markings of the Lincoln Highway. This road is the most 
westerly of the two heavy lines appearing on Defendants' 
Exhibit 22. 
In connection with ((Exhibit A", we desire to call 1~ 
the Court's attention particularly to the dotted lines which m~ 1 
extend from the center of Section 6, Township 2 South, 1001 
Range 7 West and extending in a northwesterly direction to ~l 
Highway 40; also the dotted lines running from the old ~~ 
highway east up into the Stansbury Mountains from Musk- ~ve 
rat Spring in Section 13, Township 2 South, Range 8 West; ~er 
a dotted line extending from Section 34, Township 2 South, ~n 
Range 8 West, and to the dotted line evidencing an old ~to 
I 
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roadway running east and northwest through Sections I6 
and I7, Township I South, Range 7 West. These old trails 
apparently are the only ones evidenced upon the ground 
sufficient to have received the description or characteriza-
tion of a trail at the time this plat was prepared. 
Particularly do we desire to point out to the Court 
that there is nothing on this plat in the official records of 
Tooele County, which shows any trail or road running 
north and south other than the old Lincoln Highway 
marked by two heavy lines on plaintiff's ((Exhibit A". 
This old Lincoln Highway is evidenced on this serial 
photo of defendants' ExhibitS, and is the more westerly of 
the roads mentioned. 
Clearly appearing upon plaintiff's ((Exhibit A", and 
likewise reflected in defendents' serial photo, Exhibit S, are 
the trails which we have heretofore pointed out as ap-
pearing on plaintiff's ((Exhibit A". This old Lincoln High-
way as it now appears on the ground is best evidenced by 
plaintiff's ((Exhibit M"-a photograph. 
Historically, Skull Valley has contained not more 
than four ranches,-the first of which appears at Iosepa, 
and three others appear to the south at points where there 
is some water emanating from the higher mountains of 
the Stansbury Range. (Neff Deposition P. 65) Except 
for the short period of time when the old Lincoln Highway 
traversed this valley, there was no use made of any road 
other than for the purpose of serving these very few re-
sidents and the Indians located on the reservation at the 
south end of the valley. (Neff Dep. P. 67) The country 
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12 
is typical of the western desert of Utah, being alkali and 
of light clay texture and being subject to rapid erosion, 
so much so that the track of a single wagon in wet weather 
will, by washing of the rain, remain a permanent mark 
on the ground. (Tr. P. 561) 
Throughout the trial the claim of the defendants and 
intervener was that there was an old third road or wet-
weather road which was located along the foothills to the 
east of the old Lincoln Highway and the present county 
road, which was used when the old road was impassible. 
The evidence shows, nevertheless, that the only road in 
that area upon which any work was done by Tooele 
County was the old Lincoln Highway by the placing of 
markings, culverts and grading, and then, in the middle 
1920's, began the construction of the present or new 
County Road through that area, which was done by the 
county running a grader over a straight course through 
the valley and avoiding the curves of the old lower county I! 
roadway. (P. 467 and 484 of Transcript) : n 
Since the construction of this new County Road, for 
which no rights-of-way were secured, but which was 
erected in true country fashion without the securing of 
a right-of-way but by oral consent of the two or three 
residents of the valley, no other road has been recognized 
by the county. (Tr. P. 468) 
The history of the operations of Defendant's witness 
Samuel Neff appears in his deposition, which is made a 
part of the record in this case. In that deposition Neff :n 
states at Page 54 of the Deposition that he :first commenced I :u 
I 
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operations in Skull Valley in 189 3 in partnership with his 
brother. This partnership started with one band of sheep 
and they were wintered in the Skull Valley area and sum-
mered above Coalville, in Summit County, and were trailed 
between Summit County and Skull Valley in moving 
from the winter to the summer range and from the summer 
to the winter range,-the sheep being driven from Coal-
ville up Silver Creek to Parleys Canyon, down into Emi-
gration Canyon, across Salt Lake Valley, across the north-
ern tip of Rush Valley to the Stansbury Range, and then 
south into Skull Valley. It is well to point out to the 
Court at this point that in describing the operations for 
all of the time in which he was connected with them from 
1893 through 1926, Neff states that as to the area from 
Timpie Point to Iosepa they were always trailing through 
that area and were not grazing. 
In 1907 a corporation was formed under the name of 
Neff Brothers Livestock Company. What property went 
into the corporation is not shown by evidence. This corpo-
ration was sold in its entirety to the Wright Brothers, as 
appears at Page 55 of the Deposition, where Neff states: 
uwe sold them our sheep, the camp outfits and our range 
in Summit County east of Coalville", and at Page 56 Neff 
states that for a year they went out of the livestock busi-
ness. This occurred in 1910. 
A year later the partnership started operation again 
until 1921, when a corporation was formed known as the 
Neff Brothers Land & Livestock Company, this being an 
entirely new and different corporation. Mr. Neff con-
tinued as manager and operator of the corporation until 
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1926, when his entire stock interest was sold to David 
Howells. The corporation continued until the death of 
David Howells and the time when the Sharp partnership 
took over in 1939. 
At Page 70 the witness Neff states that in their opera-
tions from the time they entered Tooele County, they were 
actually in their winter grazing area. In describing their 
operations as they left Timpie Point and moved South, 
Neff, at Page 79, in response to the question: 
((Q. Your usual course of travel, however, was 
to have your wagons move up what you refer to as 
the old road, the lower road, is that correct?~.· 1 
'i' I 
((A. In dry weather our wagons would follow ?' 
the main highway because it was easier traveling; 
wasn't so rough. Then when they were ready to 
camp at night they would pull up east of the road 
to where the herder wanted to camp with the sheep 
over night." 
At Page 12 of the deposition Neff states that the 
reason the sheep would not be taken down by the old 
Lincoln Highway was because in wet weather it was muddy 
and the mud was not good for the sheep. 
At Page 14 Neff states in his direct examination that 
the usual method would be to travel the old Lincoln High-
way and turn up to the east at night with t~e herd, but 
that ((if the weather happened to be wet, and the lower 
road was muddy, there was an upper road we used to go 
over with the animals." 
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Neff at Page 80 of the deposition states that the lower 
road was 300 feet from the spring and the upper road 
was nquite some distance actually from the spring, the 
spring coming out from under a ledge to the west of the 
road." 
In his entire deposition Neff was not able to describe 
the actual course by land marks which this upper road 
might take. 
At Page 83, in referring to the light line appearing on 
the aerial photo, defendants' Exhibit 5, and referring to 
the light line which the witnesses of the defendants, Soren-
sen and Sharp, marked for defendants as their claimed 
upper road, Neff states: 
Q. But that would not be this main upper road 
that you were referring to? 
nA. It probably isn't, because I know the upper 
road came out here and took a bend down to the 
spring." 
(This point referred to as nhere" Neff identifies at 
Page 84 as the township line between 1 and 2 South, where 
a knoll appears on the township line.) 
At Page 84 Neff again states that the object of this 
upper road was to keep up there out of the soft country 
in wet weather . 
At Page 85 the question was asked Neff: 
uQ. It was more or less of a turn out only when 
there was bad weather?" 
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To which he answered: 
teA. That was the object of taking the road 
around that way." 
Defendants introduced 1n evidence their Exhibit 5, 
which is an aerial photograph of the east side of Skull 
Valley from Tim pie Point to the Deseret Livestock Com-
pany ranch at Iosepa. They had their witnesses Alton H. 
Sorensen and Ira Sharp testify in identifying the map and 
in identifying the purported upper road. Objection had 
been made by the plaintiff to the fact that the purported 
road or easement had not been identified in the pleadings 
by sufficient description to permit it to get by a general 
demurrer, and objection was made to the attempt on the 
part of plaintiff to have its engineer Sorensen identify this 
purported road on the map as being a road upon which he 
walked, for the reason that it was not identified with any 
of the pleadings or any other testimony. 
At Page 109 of the record George M. Cannon, one of 
the attorneys for defendants, states in connection with 
the testimony of Sorensen as outlined above: 
((May as well make our position clear. We ex-
pect to show that this is a high county road, what 
they call the high road, and that it is the road used '\:: 
away back in the early 90's as a high road during 
the wet season over which our sheep outfit went 
and over which wagons and other vehicles traveled 
during the wet season. I want this witness to ex-
1 
:.~ 1 
plain the condition of that road at the present · .,
1 
time." ! ... J 
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Again, at Page 241 of the transcript, Edward W. 
Clyde, also of counsel for defendants and intervener, in 
describing the rights that defendants and intervener were 
claiming over the property of the plain tiff, states: 
t(We have either got one as public highway, or 
prescription, since it passed to private ownership, 
or we are going to have to condemn one by way of 
necessity. We are not trying to in this action." 
Again, at Page 207, Mr. Clyde states: 
t(Mr. Clyde: Now, your Honor, the big block 
of this country under the testimony of Mr. Soren-
sen of Deseret Land & Livestock Company even 
now is owned by the public. 
THE COURT: Yes, but you have a little more 
interest than a road here. You may have a pre-
scriptive right for your client, may you not? 
Mr. Clyde: Correct, but we are trying to show 
both public and prescriptive, and I am not trying 
to show prescriptive by this witness." 
This comment resulted from a discussion relative to 
plaintiff's cross-examination of Joseph Stillman, a witness 
::. for the defendants, to the effect that Skull Valley was a 
~ · wide, broad and flat valley several miles east and west, and ~j 
at through all of which sheep men have driven their sheep. 
Again at Page 3 54 of the record, in explaining the 
position of the defendants and their claim to either a 
. public or private right-of-way through the country, and 
in his argument on an objection to the examination of the 
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witness relative to land at Timpie, Mr. Clyde states: ((I 
think this is the black acre Mr. Burton has found for us 
that we have tied our trail appurtenant to. Apparently 
we have got a ranch at Timpie," so that the defendants were 
looking for some means of asserting a right to claim a 
private right-of-way by showing they had purchased some 
property which had appurtenant to it their claimed right-
of-way, and, as indicated at Page 354, the defendants 
would have to amend to be able to sustain this issue. 
The defendants and intervener, from the time of 
taking the deposition of Neff through all the presentation 
of the ·Case, were faced with a dilemma in that if all of Skull 
Valley was winter grazing land, then no trail or county 
road could be shown; and in order to show that the area 
from Timpie to losepa was trail, and was not used by the 
defendants or intervener or the public as grazing land, 
the defendants and intervener by all of their witnesses had 
them testify that they were trailing and were not grazing l~i~ 
through that area. Typical of this testimony are the fol-
lowing quotations from the witnesses: 
Samuel Neff, at Page 92 of his deposition: ((We were 
always trailing through there." 
Jasper Brown, at Page 107 of the transcript: 
((Q. Now, if you held sheep pointed in a given 
direction, say, southwest through Skull Valley, and 
moved them a distance of, say, six miles per day, 
would you, as a stock man, say that you were 
grazing those sheep or that you were trailing them? 
((A. You are trailing." l/r 
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Again, at Page 87, in speaking of all the herds of sheep 
he saw going through there, Jasper Brown states: uThey 
trailed along the upper road near to the mountain." 
W. E. Matthews typifies the type of his examination 
and testimony on Page 213 of the transcript, where he 
was asked: 
uQ. And during that time were the sheep trailed 
in herds in the fall going south from Timpie Point 
down toward Iosepa? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see the herds trailing? 
A. Yes." 
Joseph Stillman, at Page 223 of the record in his 
direct testimony, and typifying his testimony, also was 
asked: 
uQ. Can you think of others that were trailing 
their sheep from Timpie south toward Brown's 
ranch during those years? 
A. Jeremys. 
Q. Was he trailing as early as 1900? 
A. I am quite sure that he trailed until then." 
At Page 224 Stillman states: uBrowns trailed." 
At Page 225 Mr. Clyde asked Stillman: uAt the times 
you trailed your sheep, what trail did you follow?" 
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Peter A. Jensen, a herder for defendants, at Page 323 
of the record was asked by Mr. Clyde if he accompanied 
his sheep as they trailed from Tim pie Point to losepa Ranch. 
At Page 3 66 of the transcript, Witness Clark, a sheep 
herder for the defendants, testified that he and the other 
herders drove through that area, making five to six or more 
miles per day. Describing the course they followed, on 
direct testimony Clark says that in driving the sheep they 
followed ttright along close to the highway and east". 
This same Witness Clark, at Page 374 of the record, 
speaking of their practice, stated, ttl£ nobody is around to 
bother me, I will spread them and fill them up just as 
much as I possibly can: always did and always will." In 
his testimony Clark testified he was advised in 1947 that he 
was not to go on the private lands of Deseret Livestock 
Company, and stated, ttYes, I had been told that I had to 
stay below the road." 





ttQ. In fact, Ira Sharp told you to go on it" ~~ 
(Deseret Livestock land), ((didn't he?" 
A. Well, Ira Sharp told me to let my sheep go 
in those grease woods and have them killed." 
To this same effect, Joseph H. Dayton, one of the 
sheep herders of defendants, testified to a conversation 
with Mr. Moss of the Deseret Livestock Company in 1930, 
and on Page 312 of the transcript the following appears: 
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HQ. What did Mr. Moss say to you? 
A. Mr. Moss came out and told me, he says, ci 
thought I told you to stay below the road.' I says, 
(That's right.' He says, cHow is it you are not be-
low the road?' 
A. I said, ci have got a lot of sore-footed sheep, 
and I have got to try to get them along and take 
them on into Timpie,' and I said, ci have got to 
go where I can take them along the best.' " 
On Page 315 he says that Mr. Moss answered: ccWell, 






On Page 315 also Mr. Dayton states as follows: 
ccAnd you would usually have some excuse of that kind 
to give to Mr. Moss-
• 
A. That's correct. Not always, I didn't." 
The defendant Sharp in his testimony further empha-
sizes the fact that the defendants and intervener never 
claimed or asserted a right to trail over any of the lands 
of the Deseret Livestock Company, and Sharp at Page 348 
states: 
ccA. Yes. Mr. Moss said, when I told him that I 
was out there with the Howells Livestock inter-
est, he said, cw ell, I would like you, when you go 
through the country north, to go below the road.' 
Q. What did you say to him in answer to that? 
A. I said, cMr. Moss, we have men along with 
the sheep company who have been over the trail 
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and know the trail, and they go as they have always 
done.' " 
At Page 316 Mr. Dayton states: 
uQ. The camp wagon would follow along the 
county road, and the sheep would follow up in 
different paths so as to get the better feed? 
A. Yes sir." 
On Page 277 Mr. J. Earl Palmer, a district grazer 
called as a witness for the defendants, states that he has 
been in the Skull Valley area supervising the trailing of 
sheep for ten years, and at this page he states that through-
out all of those ten years the camp wagons of the Howell 
sheep were seen by him in each of the years, and in response 
to the question, uwhere would they tr.flvel", he answered: 
ttA. Along the road. 
Q. That's the present county road? 
A. That's where I have seen them, yes sir. 
Q. You have never seen them traveling any 
place except on that road? 
A. No." 
Witness Peter A. Jensen, who was the foreman of the 
defendants' sheep operation, testifies at Page 342 as follows: 
uA. No. I sighted Bill along the trail, along 
the highway. 
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Q. Now, when we speak of the highway, that 
is the road that is traveled down through the 
country? 
A. That is the county road, I guess they call it. 
Q. And there is only one county road out there, 
isn't there? 
A. Ye5." 
And at Page 343 of the transcript: 
uQ. Now, When you and Mr. Sorensen were 
speaking about roads, it was about that county 
road, wasn't it? 
A. About the county road? He said to keep 
below the road. 
Q. And when you speak about-when he men-
tioned keep below the road, there was only one 
road that you had in mind and that was that 
county road, wasn't it? 
A. That was the county road. 
Q. So when you speak of the road in Skull Val-
ley it is that county road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's the road that all of the public 
travel? 
A. That's the road." 
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At Page 344 Jensen states: 
ttQ. Your wagons always follow this county 
road? 
A. They come along the road and then-are 
going from the ranch out south? 
Q. Yes. 
* * *' 
ttQ. All the wagons follow the road until they 
get down to Brown's Ranch. Is that it? 
A. Yes, or near to Brown's Ranch. 
Q. Now, and this has been a constant practice 
since 1929? 
A. Yes, that's the way our camp wagons went." 
At Page 351 Jensen states: 
ttA. Well, we go along the trail. 
Q. Now, when you say the trail-
A. Along East of the road we would travel 
right along. 
Q. That's the county road that you mentioned? 
A. Yes." 
At Page 352: 
This Foreman Jensen also at Page 353 of the tran-
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uA. Yes, they get all the way from a half to a 
mile and a half, I guess. 
Q. From where, from the road? 
A. From the road, yes, from the road some 
places, some places a little farther. 
Q. Did you ever get up into the foothills to 
the east? 
A. Not too far up. 
Q. So they stayed between the county road on 
the west and the foothills in the east? 
A. Yes, what you would call the foothills. You 
see it varies." 
And explain this, at Page 354 he states: uSome places 
they would be right to the foothills and other times they 
wouldn't be to the foothills." 
Milton B. Cannon, one of the witnesses for defendants, 
states that he was employed by the old Neff Brothers Land 
& Livestock Company at the time Mr. Howells became 
interested until the name was changed in 1932, his experi-
ence commencing in December, 1925. At Page 295 of the 
transcript Cannon was testifying to a conversation he had, 
the exact date of which is not given. This is the purported 
conversation: 
ceQ. Which side of that road did they want you 
to keep your sheep on? 
A. They tried to keep us to the west of the 
road. 
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Q. What did you say to Mr. Moss when he told 
you to keep them below that road? 
A. We used to just pass the buck, pass the burk 
to the foreman and to somebody else. 
Q. You didn't tell him that, did you, that you 
were trying to pass the buck? 
A. No. 
Q. What did you tell him? 
A. I told him the foreman was in charge of 
the trailing of the sheep and I would report it 
to him. 
Q. Did you move your sheep down below the 
road? 
A. I gave no orders to the sheep men at all. 
Q. And where did they trail? 
A. They trailed along the road or to the left 
of the road, particularly the left. Usually I could 
find them on the left of the road." 
Speaking of the directions he had received from the 
Deseret Livestock Company, at Page 296 of the tran-
script Mr. Cannon further states: 
ttA. They always told us the same story, that 
they owned Skull Valley practically and that we ~ 111 
were trespassing and should keep the sheep below 
d I d ~ the road an rai roa them through. It was a 
hazing process with them. I ordered them as much :lc 
as we could." ~~ 
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The principal part of the foregoing statement of facts 
has been inserted to indicate to the court a general type of 
testimony as to the purported location of the trail as 
indicated by the witnesses for the defendants and inter-
veners. Also the fact that, as they went through that 
territory, they were always trailing to some point north 
or south, and to indicate that there was never any defini-
tion by any wheel track or other evidence on the ground 
as to the trail, leaving the entire matter one of conjecture. 
Typifying the fact that the road or trail was neve·r identi-
fied and that its very existence was also in dispute is the 
following statement made by Judge Ellett, as it appears 
at page 522 of the transcript, wherein the Judge denied 
the interveners' motion for a continuance for the purpose 
of permitting a survey of a road or trail: 
uThe difficulty with that is going to be this, that 
if you survey a straight line through and take all 
these witnesses out there, I may have every one of 
them disagreeing at some point with that trail. If I 
give you a trail, I ought to do it on the theory that 
I find where it goes, and the witnesses may let me 
down. Wherever I survey one, they will say, cit 
wasn't here. It was down there.'" 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The description of the claimed roadway, trail and 
water right at Burnt Springs in the Complaint in Inter-
vention and Cross Complaint of defendants is so indefinite 
and conflicting as to be subject to a general demurrer and 
~m• 1 d specia emurrer. 
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2. There was no evidence introduced or pleadings to 
support Findings, and no Findings to support the decree 
from which the Court could decree either a public road or 
a private easement. 
3. There was no evidence, pleading or finding from 
which the court could find a prescriptive easement at 
Burnt Springs in favor of intervener. 
4. The easement in gross which the court decreed to 
intervenor is excessive and so indefinite that as a matter 
of law the judgement should be set aside. This statement 
applies to the area at Burnt Springs as well as the other 
points, and includes the further proposition that there 
was no evidence to sustain an easement in gross. 
5. The· lands, the title to which was in the state of [: 
Utah, and being purchased under contract with the state 
of Utah by Jeremy and leased from Jeremy by the Deseret 
Stock Company, could not be subject to prescriptive ease-
ment. 
6. Lands the patent to which has been issued from 
the United States or the state of Utah for less than twenty 
years could not be subject to a prescriptive easement. 
7. The intervener could not by lease or assignment to 
the Sharps permit them to use or acquire any eastment in 
gross in favor of intervenor, and the court erred in dis-
missing the trespass as to the defendants Sharp. 
8. The attempt of the court by findings and judg-
ment to establish title in intervener to lands in three states 
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and various counties, and permitting a tacking to estab-
lish an easement in gross, is in error, as an easement in gross 
cannot be transferred by a transfer of land. 
9. The court erred in permitting intervener to survey 
and introduce in evidence a survey of a purported road 
after the case had been tried and submitted, and which 
survey does not follow any course testified to by any 
witness in the trial of the case. 
10. The court erred in decreeing that the water of 
Burnt Springs were public and subject to appropriation, 
and that plaintiff had no title, appropriation or ownership 
to the waters of the spring for the reason that plaintiff had 
not put in issue its title to the waters, and defendants and 
interveners on their failure to establish a right could not 
have plaintiff's right adjudicated. 
11. The court erred in decreeing the right of inter-
vener to trail and graze its sheep over all of Section 3 6, 
Township 2 South, Range 8 West, and Section 2, Town-
ship 3 South, Range 8 West as there was no evidence to 
sustain any finding or judgement for such easement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
THE DESCRIPTION OF THE CLAIMED ROAD-
WAY AND TRAIL AND RIGHT TO WATER 
AT BURNT SPRINGS IN THE COMPLAINT 
IN INTER VENTI ON AND CROSS-COMPLAINT 
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OF DEFENDANTS IS SO INDEFINITE AND 
CONFLICTING AS TO BE SUBJECT TO A 
GENERAL DEMURRER AND SPECIAL DE-
MURRER 
As will appear at Pages 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the record, 
this action was filed April 28, 1947. The cross-complaint 
was filed January 21, 1948, and the complaint in inter-
vention was filed June 3, 1948. The cause came on to be 
heard July 15, 1948. Time for pleading to the complaint 
in intervention had been extended by counsel and demur-
rers, both special and general, together with answers were 
served and filed July 12, 1948, the day before the matter 
came on for trial, and on the date of trial the demurrers 
were submitted to the Court, with the request that the 
claimed easements, whether public or private, and their 
exact boundaries, be required to be definitely set forth by 
the defendants and intervener. The Court denied the 
demurrers, permitting the filing only of the general de-
murrer and denying of special demurrers as untimely, and 
refusing to require the defendants and cross-complaint 
more specifically to set forth the exact boundaries of their 
claimed right-of-way. (Tr. P. 5) 
At the time the motion was submitted to the Court 
the complaint in intervention alleged that the intervener 
had appropriated and used the waters of Burnt Springs, and 
that intervener and its predecessors-in-interest had for more 
than fifty years used a well-defined trail and roadway in 
common with other members. of the public, with the center 
line of said trail and roadway indicated by a dotted line 
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mencement on the north but no termination on the south, 
and running generally through certain sections in south-
easterly and southwesterly directions. It also alleged the 
trail is adjacent to Burnt Springs and that ttsaid trail and 
roadway and the water at and from said Burnt Springs 
for more than fifty years * * * have been used and ap-
propriated by the intervener and its prede,cessors, and such 
use has been open, notorious and adverse." (Par. 14 and 15 
of complaint in intervention.) 
Paragraph 17 of the complaint in intervention al-
leges that the trail and roadway and Burnt Spring were in 
existence at the time plaintiff's lands were public domain, 
and the trail and roadway was a public highway, was 
used by the public generally for trailing sheep; and also 
Burnt Spring was used prior to the Federal conveyance in 
1900 of these lands to the State of Utah, and that the 
trail and roadway and the right to the use of the waters 
of Burnt Spring were all reserved and excepted from the 
grants to the State of Utah by the federal government, 
and were likewise reserved when the State of Utah con-
veyed to the plaintiff. 
The cross-complaint of defendants Sharp set forth 
the same allegations, definitely alleging that the use of the 
trail and roadway and Burnt Springs was by the public 
and was used by the defendants Sharp as members of the 
public, with the trail as a public trail and Burnt Springs 
as a public watering hole. 
We submit that the Court erred in denying the de-
murrers to require the defendants and intervener to defi ~-
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nitely describe the boundaries of the claimed easements 
and should have required them to definitely state what 
they claimed and whether they claimed as public or pri-
vate easements. 
In the case of Sullivan v. Candas, 7 6 Utah, S 8 S; 290 
Pac. 954, our Court at Page 590 of the Utah Reports 
states: 
uwhere it is sought to have it decreed that a per-
son's realty is subject to a use or easement in favor 
of another, it must be described in the pleadings 
with such certainty as to enable the defendant to 
definitely know what portion is so claimed, and 
that the judgment establishing the valadity of a 
claim to use or easements in land must be definite 
and certain as to the property affected. * * * a 
right of way which is too indefinite for a determin-
ate description, cannot be established and protected. 
::· * :-,.. the complaint must describe so as to show the 
nature, extent and location of the right claimed in 
order that a definite decree may be entered. ::- * * 
The propositions may well be conceded." (Italics 
ours) 
Throughout the entire trial of this case the pleadings 
remained as heretofore set forth without amendment or 
de·finition; in fact, near the conclusion of the trial, at 
Page 521 of the transcript, the attorneys for defendants 
and intervener made a motion to the court for a continu-
ance for the purpose of permitting them to have a survey 
made of the roadway or trail, whichever the Court should 
find. This motion was made after the Court had taken 
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At Page 522 of the transcript, Judge Ellet, in denying 
the request of counsel, states: 
uThe difficulty with that is going to be this, that 
if you survey a straight line through and take 
these witnesses out there, I may have every one of 
them disagreeing at some point with that trail. If 
I give you a trail, I ought to do it on the theory that 
I find where it goes, and the witnesses may let me 
down. Wherever I survey one, they will say, (It 
wasn't here. It was down there.'" 
In the case of Sullivan v. Condas, supra, at Page 591, 
the Court states that the claim of the defendant was not 
to a private easement, privilege or advantage, but was a 
public highway. The Court indicated that the defendant 
by his counterclaim was required to describe the highway 
- said to be adjudged a private highway, insofar as it affects 
·~ plaintiff's lands, with such reasonable certainty as to 
identify it and to fully apprise the plaintiff is. particularity 
- the manner in which their lands were to be affected by the 
location of the highway. 
In the Sullivan case the plaintiffs themselves de-
": scribed a roadway in their complaint that indicated it was 
~ a private road for the convenience of the plaintiffs, and 
~ in this connection the Court states: 
((There thus was no issue as to the identity of 
the roadway or as to its course and distance, so far 
as it affected the lands of the plaintiffs. What in 
such respect divided the parties was as to whether 
the roadway was a private way or a public highway. 
There thus was in the counterclaim a sufficient gen-
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eral description of the roadway which fairly ap-
prized the plaintiffs of the location of it sought to 
to be adjudged a public highway and the lands of the 
plaintiffs affected thereby, to admit evidence with 
respect thereto. In such circumstances the com-
plaint made by the plaintiffs does not so much in-
volve what they call substance, but an imperfect 
description, one requiring a great particularity or 
to be made more specific or certain, which, if such 
defect existed, was required to be called in question 
by a special demurrer." 
Alton H. Sorenson, a civil engineer and witness for 
defendants, at Page 13 3 of the record, states: 
uThere really are three roads discernible: one 
east of the existing county road; that is, when I say I 
(the existing county road', I mean the present main 
county road, so that we get the same picture. ~ 
At Page 142 Mr. Sorenson marked this road with . ~ 
crosses as the road claimed by the defendants as the old 
county road. 
Witness Neff, in his deposition at Page 83, stated 
that this line or road as marked by Sorenson was not the 
old road that he had in mind. 
Sharp, one of the defendants, outlined with further 1
:; 
crosses the same course as indicated by Sorenson on what 1~ 
he (Sharp) thought was the road. I 1ft 
In his testimony, at Pages 605 and 606 of the tran- ~~ 
script, Edward Clyde, attorney for defendants, states 
that it was his understanding the dotted line shown on tr1j 
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their HExhibit C" was the road marked on the aerial.photo 
with the crosses and circles (Defendants' Exhibit 5), and 
at Page 606 Mr. Clyde further states that the road so 
marked on the aerial photo on Exhibit C is not the road 
that was surveyed and found by the court in its total. 
Clyde admits he does not know where it differs. 
Witness Richards, who surveyed the purported road 
found by the Court, at Page 627 indicates that for better 
than a half mile he surveyed a course following the stakes 
and states: ((During part of that distance the road was 
visible but the good part of it we just followed stakes," 
further explaining that when he said Hroad" it would be 
just wheel tracks in the grass. 
We submit that the pleadings are entirely too in-
definite to sustain any decree or judgment or state a cause 
of action for the definition of either a public or private 
easement; and further submit that the definition in the 
pleading of a right-of-way as a public or as a private 
eastment is so inconsistent as to make the complaint sub-
ject to a general demurrer. 
The pleadings as they now stand set forth that there 
is a public trail or roadway through this upper area; that 
it has been used by intervener and defendants as a public 
road or trail over the objections of plaintiff; and the Court, 
after the case had been tried and resubmitted, permitted 
an amendment to allow the intervener to set up a claim 
to a private easement to trail and graze lands over an area 
of two miles, following, nevertheless, this same public 
trail or roadway. 
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In the case of Bertolina v. Fra.tes, 89 Utah, 238; 57 
Pac. (2d) 346, at Page 250 of the Utah Reports, the Court 
states: 
((The public was not a party to the litigation. 
There is nothing to indicate in the pleadings or in 
the findings any dedication to the use of the public 
or any grant to the public. Such right, if estab-
lished, would conflict with the prescriptive right 
pleaded by defendants." 
It is submitted, therefore, in the above argument that 
a party in its pleading setting forth that a roadway or 
trail is a public and a prive easement asserts such a 
conflicting right as not to state a cause of action. The 
trail or roadway must be held public or private; it cannot 
be both. 
It is further submitted that the description of the 
purported trail or roadway being a disputed and contested 
fact-first, is that as between plaintiff and interveners 
and defendants it is contended that there is no such road-
way, and second, that as among the witnesses for the de-
fendants and interveners the locations of the roadway or 
trail was conflicting-the interveners and defendants 
must definitely describe the trail and roadway so as to 
fully and completely advise the plaintiff where the same 
would be located. A failure to do this constitutes a 
failure to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action 
and to subject the complaint to a general demurrer, and 
the court erred in failing to sustain that general demurrer. 
Under the authority of the Sullivan v. Condas case, 
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special demurrer of the plaintiff in which special demurrer 
plaintiff requested the court to require the defendants 
and interveners to more definitely describe the course of 
the claimed road or trail and to set forth whether they 
claimed the trail and road were public or private. Defi-
nitely the court erred in refusing to consider the pleadings 
so submitted and in arbitrarily striking the special de-
murrer. 
POINT NO. II. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE INTRODUCED 
FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD DECREE 
EITHER A PUBLIC ROAD OR A PRIVATE 
EASEMENT. 
A reading of the transcript from pages 40 through 
48 will disclose to the court the background under which 
counsel for plaintiff and defendants entered into a stipula-
tion, as the same appears at page 44 and 45 of the tran-
script. In this stipulation it was agreed that the plaintiff 
was the owner and had the possessory right of all of the 
lands described in the complaint, as fee owner and lessee, 
subject to any limitation that the patents put upon those 
lands. Mr. Clyde at Page 44 states: 
((We are willing to stipulate that they own the 
interest in these lands as the fee owner, subject, how-
ever, to any limitations that the patents put on. 
That's the reason we want them in." 
The Court: ((All right." 
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The limitation provided by the patents is incorporat-
ed in the record as it appears at page 45 of the transcript, 
and subjects the lands to any easement or right of way of 
the public to use all such highways as may have been estab-
lished according to law under the same or any part thereof. 
At page 46 of the transcript Mr. Clyde asked the court 
to take judicial notice that, as to the lands upon which 
patent had not issued, the patent when issued would con-
tain this same limitation. At page 41 of the transcript 
Mr. Clyde stated: 
HI don't admit and never will that you own the 
complete fee in total, complete from easements, 
because all your patents have reservation of ease-
ment in them." 
At Page 45 the court stated: 
Isn't this a fact, that the patents just say csub-
ject to all trails and rights-of-way that may have 
been established'? '~ 
Mr. Clyde: ((Yes." 
The Court: ((Can't you stipulate to that, and you have 
got to prove your trails and rights-of-way any-
way?" 
Mr. Clyde: uThat is the only reason I want them in." 
The Court: Hy our patent will not specify any trail by 
meters and bounds." 
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The record, therefore, stands with a stipulation be-
tween the plaintiff, the interveners and defendants that 
the plaintiff is the owner in fee and as lessee on all of the 
lands set forth in the complaint subject only to such high-
ways as could be established under the reservations con-
tained in the patents. Throughout all of the trial the 
pleadings and the stipulation between plaintiff and defend-
ants limited any right claimed by the defendants and 
interveners to such trail or roadway as they could estab-
lish under the reservations in the patents. 
At the outset of this argument, therefore, we submit 
that any attempt on the part of the interveners and de-
fendants and the court to permit or recognize any private 
easement at any point was entirely inconsistent and con-
trary to the stipulation entered into by the parties, and 
an attempt to vary a solemn agreement between counsel 
before the court as to what the various clai~ were. Any 
use of any purported trail or roadway through this country 
which could in any way be identified with any trail or 
roadway claimed to be reserved by the patents would be 
material, and the attempt subsequently of interveners and 
defendants and the court to take such testimony for the 
purpose of establishing a private easement contrary to this 
stipulation of counsel was gross error, and deprived plain-
tiff at any time during this trial of protecting itself by 
proof or cross examination. 
This case proceeded to trial on the pleadings of de-
fendents as shown by their cross-complaint, and inter-
vener as indicated by its complaint in intervention. In 
the cross-complaint the Sharps state their rights to go 
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over the lands owned and leased by plaintiff as being a 
right in common with the public. 
Paragraph 12 of the cross-complaint states that the 
cross-complainants and Howells Livestock, Inc., and their 
predecessors-in-interest, have for over fifty years used a 
well-defined trail and roadway in common with other 
members of the public, which trail is in excess of 150 feet 
wide. In Paragraph 13 of the cross-complaint they allege 
that the trail is adjacent to Burnt Springs, and that the 
trail and roadway and water at and from Burnt Springs 
have been used by the cross-complainants and Howells 
Livestock, Inc., and their predecessors-in-interest and the 
public for stock-watering purposes. 
Paragraph 15 of the cross-complaint alleges that the 
trail and roadway and Burnt Springs were in existence 
when the lands of plaintiff were public domain, and that 
the trail and roadway at that time was a public highway ·, 
and used by the public generally for trailing sheep, and 
the waters of Burnt Springs were used for watering of 
livestock, and that the Federal Government conveyed the 
lands to the State of Utah, subject to the right of the 
public to use the trail and roadway, and subject to the 1 ~ 
right of the public to use the waters of Burnt Springs for i ~ 
watering livestock, and that when the State of Utah con-
veyed to plaintiff the lands were conveyed, subject to the 
use by the public of the highway, and subject to the right 
of the public to use the waters of Burnt Springs. 
The complaint in intervention in Paragraph 13 claims 
that Howells Livestock, Inc., and its predecessors-in-inter-
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est have driven their sheep through this country twice a 
year, trailing them for a distance of several hundred miles. 
In Paragraph 14 the intervener alleges that in making 
this spring and fall trail it has used a well-defined trail and 
roadway in common with other members of the public, 
the center line of the trail and roadway being described 
as heretofore set forth in this brief. 
In Paragraph 17 the intervener again sets forth that 
the trail and roadway, when created, was upon public 
domain, and at that time the trail and roadway was a 
public highway and used by the public generally for the 
purpose of trailing sheep; that when the lands in Burnt 
Springs area were conveyed to the· State of Utah by the 
United States, they were subject to the trail and roadway 
and the right of the public to water at Burnt Springs, and 
that when the lands were conveyed by the State of Utah to 
plaintiff, they were likewise subject to this public right. 
This was the state of the pleadings throughout all of 
the trial up to and including the time the parties rested 
their case on July 16, 1948. Following the trial of the 
case and the submission to the Court, the parties submitted 
their briefs to the Court upon the record and pleadings 
then before the Court. Following this, and three months 
subsequent thereto, the intervener was permitted, over the 
objection of plaintiff, to amend its complaint in interven-
tion and reopen its case to admit further testimony as to 
a survey of an entirely different road, which the Judge had 
himself determined. 
The amendment was to the effect that intervener and 
its predecessors-in-interest had used all of the property of 
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plaintiff between the new county road and the foothills to 
the east for trailing and grazing their sheep on said property 
from Timpie Point to the losepa Ranch, and that the claim 
to this use had been since 1911, and that by the use of the 
property and grazing of the forage, intervener has ac-
quired an easement in gross to trail across the property 
and the right to graze 14,000 of its sheep on the property 
while trailing across the same between the county road 
and the foothills. 
We submit that the court and counsel having pro-
ceeded to a trial consuming a week in July of 1948, in 
which the only issue was whether there was a public trial 
and roadway through this country, and the case having 
been tried and submitted to the court on that theory, the 
Court could not subsequently permit an amendment set-
ting forth a private easement in intervener. We submit 
that any such an amendment was not timely; that it 
brought in an entirely new and different cause of action 
and issues upon which the plaintiff was entitled to have 
time in which to raise and plead issues and produce testi-
mony. 
It is submitted as a general principle of law that 
neither an individual nor the public can acquire an ease-
ment generally through a country. We have involved in 
the decree of the Court the granting of a prescriptive right 
to intervener of a trail approximately 3000 feet in width, 
extending from the grease woods on the west to the foot-
hills on the east and along the general course of a road. 
That road does not exist on the ground and is not marked, 
except as some ancient wagon tracks will appear at one 
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or two points in the course of fifteen miles, and this pre-
scriptive right so granted is certainly violative of the above 
principle and could not in more explicit words violate the 
above principle, because it actually uses the words ((gen-
eral course." 
Not only is the right given to trail the sheep but the 
Court gives the intervener the right to graze all of this 
land, giving it a profit a prendre. Not only that, but the 
Court extends this private easement for a width of two 
miles by giving to intervener the right to trail and graze 
its sheep over all of Section 36, Township 2 South, Range 
8 West, and all of Section 2, Township 3 South, Range 
8 West. 
In support of this purported public road and private 
easement the following is submitted as an analysis of all 
of the evidence introduced by defendants and intervener 
for the establishment of this purported trail. 
As to the light streak appearing in the aerial photo-
graphs of defendants (their Exhibit 5) , and which has 
been identified on the exhibit by the defendant Sharp and 
his engineer Sorensen as to what they thought appeared 
to be a road and by Sharp as to a trail he thought his sheep 
had followed in the ten years' experience he had had, Sam 
Neff the defendants and interveners, principal witness at 
Page 8 3 of his deposition states: 
nQ. But that wouldn't be this main upper road 
that you were referring to? 
A. It probably isn't because I know the upper 
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road came out here and took a bend down to the 
stream." 
This was referring to the area in Section 29 and 3 2, 
Township 2 South, Range 7 West. 
The witness Samuel Neff had been in Skull Valley 
since prior to 1900 and had formed the corporation into 
which the intervener subsequently purchased. In his 
entire deposition he did not specify that he had at any 
time operated sheep in any particular section of land. Nev-
er at any time does he indicate that his sheep would have 
been in Section 36, Township 2 South, Range 8 West, or 
in Section 2 South, Range 8 West. Neff's testimony at 
Page 9 of his deposition is that when he had 6000 sheep 
he had two bands, and that when he had 20,000 sheep he 
had seven bands, but he never indicated for how long a 
period or during what period he had the various number 
of bands. 
Describing at Page 10 the course they took, he said, 
they were ((taking a southerly direction from the Point of 
the Mountain to the spring." This same witness Neff, as 
appears on Page 15, had entirely lost his recollection as to 
the roads, for he was under the impression that the old 
lower road was the new county road, and at Page 15 of his 
deposition he states that the lower main road was turn-
piked. He said their wagons would always follow the 
lower road except when it was muddy. 
At Page 17 of his deposition Neff states that the 
course they took was practically always above the main 
highway. 
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At Page 18 of his deposition Neff says, ualways up 
until 1926, we just trailed through there any place. We 
didn't restrict them to any certain point, but we followed 
the general direction each year." In describing the width 
of the course they would have taken through the country, 
Neff indicates they may have covered at various times two 
miles. 
Again at Page 19, when he was asked if he kept his 
sheep east of the old lower highway, Neff said, ((Yes, 
usually." 
Neff at another time described a course that the 
road took throughout this purported distance between 
Timpie and the plaintiff's ranch at Iosepa, merely indicat-
ing that it was adjacent to the old highway and constituted 
a turn-out in bad weather. 
At Page 29 of the deposition Neff stated that at no 
time in the history of his operation did anyone interfere 
with him or tell him not to trail through the area. 
At Page 34 Neff states that this same trail that he had 
used was likewise used by the Stillmans, John Y. Smith, the 
Browns, the W rathalls and the Eleasons. The history of 
this use commenced in 18 9 3. 
At Page 40 Neff states that as they would get near 
the area of Deep Spring the trail would be farther away 
from the east mountains than it was toward Timpie Point, 
stating, uoh, yes; considerably farther away." 
At Page 41, when his attention was directed to mark-
ings on the aerial photo, N elf stated they did not hold 
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them to a line; spread them out as far as it was convenient 
for them to travel. 
At Page 42, Neff states that in the area of Deep 
Spring, .. we went right south and covered any territory 
there that we cared to." 
At Page 73 of the deposition, and pages immediately 
prior and following, Neff indicates the course he followed 
with his sheep for the years he was connected with the 
operation from Summit County to Skull Valley, indicat-
ing many streams and springs where the sheep would water, 
and indicates that he had never claimed he had appropri-
ated water at any of these points. 
At Page 75 Neff states, (~I don't think we ever con-
veyed any water rights." 
There is nothing in the entire testimony of Neff to 
indicate that he had been taken out over any purported 
old road now in existence, and indicated that was the 
road he had in mind. The only thing we have is the fact 
that the light line marked by crosses by defendants and 
intervener's witnesses is stated by Neff not to be the road. 
As appears from Neff's testimony at Page 84, there is 
nothing on the map or on the ground to indicate the point 
where the old road went. 
At Page 8 5 Neff states that the only purpose of this 
purported upper road was as a turn-out when the weather 
was bad and the road was soft and impassable. 
At Page 87 Neff indicates as follows: 
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uQ. And your sheep would be grazing through-
out that whole valley, and that would be one of 
the watering places? 
A. Yes." 
In his deposition Neff states that from the time they 
came to Tooele County they were actually in their grazing 
area. 
At Page 92 Neff indicates that they were grazing over 
Skull Valley and that would be any point on the east or 
west side, but he states they never grazed their sheep on 
either the west or east side, north of the range at losepa, 
but at Page 93 states that, nevertheless, they went into 
the valley wherever they thought their sheep would get 
the best feed, and that from the time they got around 
Timpie Point they would scatter them over a two-mile 
area or more, whatever was necessary to see that they had 
feed. 
Other witnesses called by intervener to establish its 
case included the following: 
Pharis Johnson, at Page 146 of the transcript, states, 
that there was a higher road because he followed it. 
At Page 149 of the transcript he states that they 
would go up and make a gradual curve and then generally 
south and get to Burnt Springs and then south to Salt 
Mountain. He answered that this trail could be through 
grease wood now, because of the changed conditions, as 
he had not been out there since 1920, and it would all de-
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pend on where the said grease wood was, so far as Johnson 
was concerned. (Tr. 158) :w 
He states on Page 162 of the transcript that the up- ~1 
per highway merged with the old lower road in places. 
:o At Page 173 the witness Johnson states that all of the 
j' 
herds in the valley used the same territory. This included .J 
sheep of the Deseret Livestock Company as well as Neff, ~0 
and particularly would he see the sheep of the Deseret Live- ]t 
stock Company along the mountains. ~1 
Jasper Brown, one of the old sheepmen of the area, 
called by defendants and intervener, stated that this upper 
road went forty miles, or the full length of Skull Valley, 
and that all of the sheep of all of the operators trailed in 
the same general course. He was also one of the many 
sheep operators that watered the sheep at Burnt Springs 
as he went there. His only recollection of the road was 
that the sheep trailed the upper road near the mountain. 
Paul E. Wrathall, a witness called by defendants, 
stated that the only place he had seen sheep trail was along 
the foothills on the east side of the valley (Tr. 207). He 
stated that his only knowledge of the upper road was that 
it came in at Burnt Springs, and that they never took the 
upper road at Burnt Springs unless they had to. 
William E. Mathews, a witness called by defendants, 
stated that there were 75,000 to 100,000 sheep trailing 
through there, as is indicated by his testimony at Page 213. 
At Page 214 he states that the herds usually held to the 
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At Page 214 he states that he has seen sheep along the 
lower road. At Page 218 he mentions the number of 
.(: opera tors who followed this same trail. 
Joseph Stillman at Page 223 indicates that a number 
., of operators ran their sheep in Skull Valley, and at Page 
< 225 of the transcript he states that all of these operators 
Y, followed the same general course along a high road, and 
that the high road he was speaking of ran along the lower 
edge of this trail near the grease woods. This appears defi-
nitely from his testimony at Page 227, and at Page 230 he 
-··· states that this was the trail he followed with Neff and 
that he and Neff trailed it side by side. 
At Page 238 of the transcript it appears that he and 
Neff followed the same course. 
Earl Palmer, a grazer, stated that though all of his 
experience in Skull Valley, extending over ten years, he 
had never seen any of the sheep wagons following any 
course other than the present county road. 
Milton D. Cannon, a witness for defendants and in-
tervener, states that his history with Skull Valley com-
menced in the spring of 1926. At Page 295 he states that 
the sheep trailed along the road or left of the road, and 
this road is indicated as the present county road. He testi-
fied to conversations he had had with Moss, who was then 
Manager of the Deseret Livestock Company, and when 
told by Moss to keep off their land, at Page 295 Cannon 
states, HW e used to just pass the buck, pass the buck to the 
foreman and to somebody else." ((I told him the foreman 
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was in charge of the trailing of the sheep and I would re-
port it to him." 
At Page 296 he states that Moss told them to get 
through the territory as fast as they could and that he 
(Cannon) , in order to meet the demands of Moss in get-
ting the sheep through there as fast as he could, states, ul 
ordered them as much as we could." 
At Page 305 Cannon states that the only road they 
ever traveled was the present county highway. 
Joseph H. Dayton, called as a witness by defendants 
and intervener, states at Page 216 that the camp wagons 
would follow the present county road and the sheep 
would go along the side of the road. When Moss told 
Dayton to keep his sheep off the upper side of the road, 
Dayton told him he had some sore footed animals and that 
Moss told him under the circumstances it was all right. 
Peter A. Jensen, a witness called for defendants and 
intervener, stated that his history with the operation com-
menced in 1929, and, as appears at Page 326, of the tran-
script, most of the sheep went through east of the main 
road. 
At Page 3 31 he states: ((When we get past Burnt 
Springs, then we keep up, and then that road, when you 
get north, I guess it would be directly north, some say 
north, it circles up. Then we would come right around 
up and stay, and the sheep would go along that-along 
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At Page 3 34 Jensen states that they would go through 
from eight to nine miles a day in the spring, and at Page 
344 he states that all of the wagons followed the present 
county road down from Iosepa Point, and that it had been 
a constant practice to do so since 1929. 
In describing at Pages 3 52, 3 53 and 3 54 the course the 
sheep would have taken in answer to the question as to 
whether they would cover the distance east of the road 
as much as two miles, Jensen answered, ((Sometimes, may-
be." When asked what would be the east line of the trail 
he answered, ((Well, they get all the way from a half to 
a mile and a half, I guess." When asked if they ever get 
out into the foothills he answered, ((Not too far up." Then 
he concluded at Page 3 54 by stating, ((And in some places 
they would be right by the foothills, and other times they 
wouldn't be to the foothills." 
Jack Clark, a witness for defendants and intervener, 
at Page 3 69 states, ((Well, I always trailed just along above 
the greasewoods and east of the road." 
Again at Page 370 Clark states, eel traveled the road 
just above the greasewoods." 
At Page 373 Clark states, that the camp wagon fol-
lowed the road all the way up. 
Ira Sharp, one of the defendants, states that the 
course his sheep followed was the course marked on De-
fendants' Exhibit 5 by crosses and was the only road they 
had ever followed. 
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At Page 402 Sharp states that the trail should be a 
half to a mile wide, and at Page 403 he states, ((We never 
spread our sheep wider than this as we go through there." 
We have outlined above all of the testimony that was 
presented by defendants and intervener as to the road, as 
to the trial and as to any prescriptive right they claim. The 
distance of the foothills at any point is not given; there 
is no indication as to how far west and how far east; there 
is no indication that there is any way to determine what 
the boundaries would be. There is no indication that the 
greasewood itself has increased in its growth and modified 
and changed old trails. There is no indication that storms 
have changed and modified the entire area. There is no 
indication that erosion has changed the entire area. 
In describing the course .he followed in making the 
survey of this purported old road as determined by the 
Court, Surveyor Richards at Page 626 states: 
((Q. As you proceed then south from Timpie 
Point, there was some road that you followed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, where did it disappear and you start 
to survey a line only by stake? * * * 
A. For 670 feet we followed a road. The :first 
stake was located 670 feet from the beginning 
point." 
And at Page 627 of the transcript the witness states: 
((Q. It would appear from your notes then for 
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a distance of 3,000 feet that you followed stakes 
only and no road. Is that correct? 
A. During part of the distance the road was 
visible, but the good part of it we just followed 
stakes. 
Q. When you say a road was visible, was it other 
than just tire track or wheel track in the grass? 
A. No. It was just wheel tracks in the dirt." 
A summary, therefore, of this testimony discloses 
that at no time has any witness identified the road claimed 
by defendants and intervener as the purported old road 
which the old-timers state was traveled sometime prior 
to 1920. 
The witness Neff states that the road marked by the 
crosses is not the old road he had in mind. The fact that 
sheep have gone generally through the country over an 
area several miles in width which the owner of the land 
himself has used historically as a trail and grazing area 
certainly will not support any :fiinding or decree wherein 
the Court arbitrarily sets a course for a purported road. 
The fact that witnesses stated there was a road within an 
area several miles in width certainly does not permit the 
Court then to arbitrarily assign a purported course for 
that road. 
So that this Court can appreciate the factual back-
ground in connection with the purported upper righ road, 
as found by Judge Ellett, we refer the Court at this point 
to the series of pictures introduced by plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit B IS a picture showing the pur-
ported take-off for the upper high road at Timpie Point. 
Particularly do we call the Court's attention to the various 
trails or tracks or purported roads branching off into the 
gravel bed, where the testimony shows material was se-
cured for the construction of Highway 40 in the area of 
the Stansbury Range. To the right of the picture can be 
seen the trail taking off down through the brush. Tracks 
are seen also running in a southeasterly direction through 
the center of the picture. 
Exhibit C shows another branch road or trail taking 
off through the right of the picture, and Exhibit Cis tak-
en at a point where the road disappears in the center of 
Exhibit B. 
Exhibit D shows the end of the branch road taking off 
to the left in Exhibit C, and is only a short distance south 
and east of the point where the picture in Exhibit C was 
taken,-the large cedars being easily identifiable in both 
Exhibits C and D. 
Exhibit E shows another branch taking off from the 
trail which appears headed towards the right-hand side of 
Exhibit C. 
Exhibit F is a picture taken with the camera facing to 
the west, showing a road coming up into the second gravel 
pit near Timpie Point. 
Exhibit G shows yet another fork or trail taking off 
from the fork of the road shown in Exhibit E. 
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Exhibit H is another illustration of the same point 
shown in Exhibit G. 
Exhibit I is taken with the camera facing west and 
is a short distance south of the point from which Exhibit 
H was taken, and in the right background appears Lone 
Peak referred to in the evidence. In this picture appears 
another fork from one of the roads. 
Exhibit J is a picture taken a short distance south, 
showing the end of the trail, track or road appearing in 
the left of Exhibit I. 
Exhibit K is taken with the camera facing directly 
south at the same point from which Exhibit J is taken, 
being the end of that fork of the road, showing the rocky, 
rugged country up toward the foothills, and with no in-
dication of any continuance of a road. 
Exhibit Lis taken with the camera focused in a north-
westerly direction, looking back on the same part of the 
area shown in Exhibit K. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P is taken with the camera focused 
to the west at a point twenty or thirty yards south of the 
area where Exhibit I was taken, showing Cedar Mountain 
in the background and Lone Peak in the upper left portion 
of the picture. Counsel is standing on the fork appearing 
at the right in Exhibit I, and the camera is focused on the 
left-hand fork of Exhibit I. 
Exhibit M is a photograph showing the county road 
running south through Skull Valley from Timpie Point. 
At a point in the center of the picture, to the left of the 
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first telephone pole, is the point where the track, trail or 
road, which is the right-hand fork shown in Exhibit I, 
comes into the county highway. 
Exhibit N is a picture of the present county road, 
with the camera focused north at the point where Exhibit 
M is taken, illustrating another of the branch trails or 
take-off tracks shown in previous exhibits. This point is 
approximately one mile south of Timpie Point. In the right 
center of this picture can be seen the gravel bed and road 
leading in to it. 
Exhibit 0, with the penciled figures ((P2-8" on the 
back, illustrates the old lower highway as it appeared at 
the time of trial. The present county road, with its· pole 
line, is seen in the left of the center, and this picture is tak-
en a short distance south of Timpie Point. 
Exhibit Q is a picture taken with the camera facing 
west from a point on the county road approximately due 
east of Lone Peak. This shows the old circular road coming 
up from Lone Rock Peak and branching off north or south 
as that road comes into the present county highway. 
Exhibit R is taken at the same point on the county 
highway as Exhibit Q but with the camera focused in a 
northeasterly direction and showing yet another track, 
trail or road being a continuation north and south of the 
right-hand branch appearing in Exhibit Q. 
Exhibit S illustrates a trail leading straight east from 
the present county road, and is another unidentified trail, 
road or track in that area. 
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Exhibit Tis taken at a point on the present highway 
directly east of Muskrat Springs, with the camera facing 
east toward Muskrat Canyon. This further illustrates 
the country and the lack of any road or trail in that vi-
cinity. 
Exhibit U is taken from the west edge of the present 
county highway looking to the northwest across Burnt 
Springs, with Lone Peak in the background. The light 
streak in the center of the picture represents the dam 
constructed by Deseret Livestock Company for impound-
ing and gathering the waters of the Burnt Springs area. 
Exhibit Vis a picture taken with the camera facing 
to the East on the present county highway and a short 
distance below Muskrat Springs, indicating the road lead-
ing east up to and into Muskrat Canyon. This road may 
or may not be the one indicated in plaintiff's Exhibit A, 
which is the official county plat of Skull Valley. 
Exhibit W is a picture taken from the present county 
highway at a point 200 yards south of the point in which 
the picture was taken in Exhibit V, indicating another 
road leading up and into Muskrat Canyon. 
Exhibit X is a picture taken in Section 23, Township 
2 South, Range 7 West, with the camera facing to the 
south toward what is described in the testimony as ((Big 
Knoll," which point is east of Horse Shoe or Deep Spring. 
This illustrates the type of country through that area, and 
in the center can be seen the present county highway re-
ceding into the distance. 
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This set of pictures graphically illustrates the testi-
mony of William Sorenson, the superintendent of plain-
tiff's sheep operation, and others of plaintiff's witnesses, as 
supported by the testimony of witnesses of defendants and 
intervener that this entire area is crossed by a multitude 
of tracks from sheep wagons, hunters and other users for 
various purposes, which take off in different directions 
through this entire area; and graphically illustrates the use 
that Deseret Livestock Company, the plaintiff, has made 
of its property for its own purposes and the fact that 
numerous trails would be made by its own wagons and 
herds while grazing and trailing its lands. None of these 
various trails have ever been identified by any witness as 
being the old road. 
The only testimony we have in this connection is 
that of Neff, who indicates that the streak appearing in 
the aerial map would not be the old road he had in mind. 
There is nothing in the evidence to show that the road which 
the Court found is one of the roads shown in these exhibits. 
The only indication we have in this connection is from the 
testimony of Mr. Clyde at Page 605 of the transcript, 
wherein he states that the dotted line representing the 
high road in Exhibit C attached to the complaint followed 
the road mar ked with crosses and circles on the aerial 
photograph (defendants' Exhibit 5) . This road marked 
with the crosses and circles on defendants' Exhibit 5 is 
the road claimed by intervener and defendants as the pur-
ported old road, and so indicated by defendant Sharp and 
marked by him and indicated by their engineer Mr. Soren-
son. 
At Page 606 Clyde was asked: 
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((Q. Do you know whether the road as it ap-
peared on the aerial rna p is the road that you had 
surveyed? 
A. I know that it isn't in its total. 
Q. Do you know where it doesn't meet with the 
road as claimed in your complaint? 
A. I can't tell you by metes and bounds. I know 
that it started out from the new county highway at 
Timpe Point on the same road and that after it 
went down country a distance that I would esti-
mat~ to be between a quarter and a half mile that 
the road that we had surveyed stayed high and the 
roadway that appears in the aerial photograph went 
low down. ::· * * 
Q. Now, when you walked along the road to 
put in the stakes, were there any other roads, paths, 
tracks appearing in that country? 
A. There were taking off from it and roads cross-
ing it, yes sir. 
Q. And would there be more than a half dozen? 
A. I would say there would be." 
On Page 607 Mr. Clyde indicates that the view taken 
by the Court during the trial, which would have been 
around July 10, 1948, was that Mr. Clyde went out and set 
the stakes September 30th, two and one-half months later; 
that the surveyor was not with Clyde at the time but 
went out sometime subsequent to follow the stakes, and 
that all of this occurred after counsel for plaintiff and 
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defendants had submitted their cause and filed briefs with 
the Court. 
On Page 609 Mr. Clyde states that he introduced ex-
hibits of pictures showing a road going under a fence at 
Burnt Springs, which he claimed to be the road; and Mr. 
Clyde further states that that picture indicated the road 
as coming out of the east fence line at Burnt Springs; and 
at Page 609 of the transcript Mr. Clyde further states that 
the road as claimed by them, and shown in the picture 
during the trial, is not the road surveyed and found by the 
Court. 
At Page 610 Mr. Clyde indicates that the road sur-
veyed at Burnt Springs would vary as much as a quarter 
of a mile from the road claimed by them at the time of 
the trial and as shown during the trial by their evidence, 
consisting of the testimony of witnesses identifying the 
picture exhibited showing the road coming through a 
fence. 
At Page 611 the witness Clyde states that they did not 
survey this purported public road beyond a point a quar-
ter of a mile south of Burnt Springs, ((because the road 
from that point on is in public domain and we were not 
interested in establishing its exact location. 
We submit that this status of the evidence creates 
several points of law, first, as to whether the intervener 
could acquire an easement in gross by following the course 
which it has claimed to be a public trail. As outlined 
above, the testimony of all the sheep men indicated that 
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they had followed a trail or general course through this 
area. The exact boundaries of that trail were never speci-
fically identified by any of the witnesses. 
Stillman indicated that he traveled alongside of Neff 
and they followed the identical course. The pleadings at 
the time of the trial, therefore, set forth a public trail or 
road through that area, and no private easement was as-
serted by the parties at any time during the trial. There 
was no issue before the Court during the trial of a pre-
scriptive right for by the stipulation at Page 44 of the 
transcript, the title of Plaintiff is admitted, subject only 
to the highways reserved by the patents, and these must of 
necessity be public highways. 
In the Case of Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. 
Morgan Brothers Land & Livestock Co., 81 Utah, 317; 
17 Pac. (2d) 826, at Page 318 of the Utah Report the 
Court said: 
((The plaintiff's evidence respecting the ongtn 
and establishment of the road all plainly showed a 
use by the public for fifty years or more, for the 
purpose of trailing sheep and cattle, pack horses, 
and camp outfits, hauling Wood, and for access to 
sawmills, etc. Without variation, the plaintiff's 
witnesses testified to the use of the road at all timeS 
by the public generally. Some of them testified 
expressly that it was recognized as and generally 
understood to be a public road and used by the 
public as such without objection, for many years. 
Other than a use of the road by the plaintiff and its 
privies, in common with the public, there was no 
evidence of any particular or individual right or 
claim on the part of the plaintiff. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
62 
uwhile a public road may be established, the use 
by individual persons in common with the public 
generally is regarded as permissive, and by such 
common use no individual person can acquire a 
right by prescription as against the owner of the 
fee. 19 C. J. 900; Libertini v. Schroeder, 149 Md. 
484, 132 A. 64; Tress v. Pivorotto, 104 Conn. 389, 
133, A. 35; Providence, F. R. & N. S. Co. v. City 
of Fall River, 187 Mass. 45, 72 N. E. 
In Bertolina v. Frates, 89 Utah, 23 8, 57 Pac. (2d) 
346, at Page 250 of the Utah Report the Court said: 
uThere is nothing to indicate in the pleadings or 
in the findings any dedication to the use of the 
public or any grants to the public. Such right, if 
established, would conflict with the prescrip.tive 
rgiht pleaded by defendants. 
u (Except in some jurisdictions, it has very gener-
ally been held that as the owner of land over which 
a public highway runs cannot prevent the use of 
such highway by the public, it follows that a private 
right of way cannot be acquired by prescription 
over land used as a highway, as against the owner 
of the fee. but after the discontinuance of a pub-
lic highway a private right of way may be acquired 
by prescription over the same route.' 19 C. J. 900, 
78. 
u (The right to an easement will be extinguished 
by a lawful appropriation to a public use of the 
land where the easement is located, or of other land 
which will render the enjoyment of the easement 
impossible.' 19 C. J. 957, Sec. 178." (Italics ours) 
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In Pirman v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357; 7 N. E. 2d 262, 
the court states: 
uCommon use negatives the idea of a presump-
tion in favor of an individual and does not thereby 
establish a private way." 
Also, at page 221 of 111 A.L.R., it is stated: 
((Individual acquisition of a right of way by 
prescription has been generally, if not universally, 
held impossible, where the same right of user upon 
which the claim is based has likewise been exercised 
indiscriminately by the general public, upon the 
theory that such a situation prevents the individual 
user from being (exclusive' within the meaning of 
that term as an essential requirement for the found-
ing of prescriptive easements; such founding is 
based upon the presumption of a grant, but use in 
common with the public is regarded as negativing 
this presumption, so that, if such common use exists, 
the individual user must, in order to secure the bene-
fit of the original presumption or establish an in-
dependent prescriptive right, perform some act, 
brought home to the owner of the servient estate, 
clearly indicating the user's claim." 
Also, in Day vs. Allender, 22 Md. S 11, 111 A.L.R. 222, 
it is stated: 
ulf the proof is of a use common to all others 
as well as to the party claiming the way, it does not 
establish a private way .... The presumption of a 
grant ... founded on proof of an adverse, exclusive 
and uninterrupted enjoyment ... and although 
this presumption may be made from the character 
of the user itself, ... yet, when it is shown by the 
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evidence the easement was enjoyed in common with 
others, the presumption in favor of the individual 
ceases." 
We submit that the intervener and defendants assert-
ing a public trail and roadway is entirely inconsistent 
with any claim of these defendants and intervener that 
they had acquired a prescriptive easement, and particular-
ly in view of the status of the evidence showing that the 
course they followed was a ,course followed by the public, 
and the above cases amply substantiate that conten-
tion. Such use was permissive and did not create any right. 
As detailed above, the evidence shows that Neff, who 
operated the company untill926, never had a conversation 
with anyone about the way or the use of the way through 
this country. Witness Cannon who succeeded Neff as 
manager states that whenever an assertion was made as 
to the right-of-way, he passed the buck; in other words, 
made no assertion of a right to use it; said he would follow 
the instructions to stay off the land, and so far as he could 
he ordered the sheep through there as fast as could be ac-
complished. There is certainly no assertion of any claim 
to a right to use this land by others than the first two man-
agers of this corporation. This would be true up to and ir 
until the year 19 3 2, at least. ~ 
Sharp in his testimony made no assertion of any right-
of-way on any of the Deseret Livestock Company pro-
perty, but indicated to the manager of that company 
that he had some old hands with him and he was sure 
they would follow the trail. There has never been any 
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showing on the part of intervener that it ever asserted a 
right-of-way through this country. Certainly it has shown 
none for a period of twenty years. 
In the case of Sdralis v. Rondos, Utah; 209 Pac. 
(2d) 561, this Court announced the rule to be: 
u (Where a person opens a way for the use of 
his own premises, and another person uses it with-
out causing damage, the presumption is, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, that such use by 
the latter was presumptive, and not under a claim 
of right.' This rule was re-affirmed in Jensen 
v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070. See the 
cases cited in support of the rule in 170 A.L.R. 825. 
((The facts of the instant case bring it within 
the rule laid down in Harkness v. Woodmansee 
since the defendant does not contend that the plain-
tiffs and their predecessors in title did not use the 
alleyway for their own purposes. Indeed, the evi-
dence clearly shows that the plaintiffs and their 
predecessors made use of the alleyway in receiving 
deliveries to their buildings and in gaining access 
to the tin garbage at the east end of the alleyway." 
The evidence is clear in the instant case from all of 
the witnesses for intervener that the Deseret Livestock 
Company has been using these lands for its own purposes 
as a trail and grazing lands long prior to the time of the 
incorporation of intervenor company in 1921. Those wit-
nesses testified to the fact that Deseret Livestock Company 
was grazing from 40,000 to 75,000 head of sheep long 
prior to the existence of intervener. For this reason assigned 
no right was created in intervener or defendants. 
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We desire to submit to the Court that the easement 
to trail and graze the various lands indicated by plaintiff 
is an easement in gross and cannot be assigned and is per-
sonal to the person in whose favor it is given. The trail 
from eastern Utah to eastern Nevada takes the intervener 
across the entire State of Utah. The lands owned by it 
were in Summit County and western Tooele County and 
eastern Nevada. Surely the internever cannot hope to 
contend that its history will antedate the date of its in-
corporation in 1921, because the easement described by it 
in its amendment to its complaint in intervention describes 
the claimed right-of-way as one in gross, and the decree 
does not describe the right-of-way as being appurtenant 
to any land. 
As indicated above, therefore, any such purported 
easement must be attributable to the acts of the inter-
vener, and intervener cannot tack any other rights to estab-
lish its purported easement in gross. The first act to which 
complaint could be made must be shown to be a claim or 
assertion of right by intervener or a continuance of a 
repeated act which would give notice in law of such a claim. 
In the intsant case we have an open desert land, un-
enclosed, grazed and trailed at various times by herds of 
sheep over an area 15 to 20 miles in width and over 60 miles 
in length. Certainly a use twice a year will be presumed 
in law to be permissive, unless very clear and direct acts 
occur to indicate the :contrary. 
In the case of Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 
202, 116 Pac. 843, at page 845, the court states as follows: 
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ult can hardly be contended that it was ever 
the intent of the law to hold that a private easement 
could be created over the lands of another at a time 
when they were open and uninclosed. It has never 
been so held, although the right be asserted by the 
public, unless under some controlling circum-
stances, such as the expenditure of public moneys 
under the supervision of the road overseer, or some 
element of acquiescence on the part of the owner, as 
instanced in the case of State v. Horlacher, 16 Wash. 
325, 47 Pac. 748. We conceive it to have been so 
held in Watson v. County Commissioners, 38 Wash. 
662, 80 Pac. 201, where the court said: (While we 
do not now hold that a right of way by prescription 
cannot be acquired over wild, unoccupied prairie 
lands, we do hold that, in order to give a prescriptive 
right, the use must at least be such as to convey to 
the absent owner reasonable notice that a claim is 
made in hostility to his title. It seems to us that any 
other rule amounts to a practical confiscation of 
private property for public purposes.' It will be 
admitted that the rule must of necessity be more 
liberal in favor of the public than in favor of an 
individual." 
Volume 17, Am. Jur. at Page 980, Paragraph 71, reads 
as follows: 
nThe prevailing principle seems to be that 
while a way may be acquired by user or prescription 
by one person over the uninclosed land of another, 
mere use of the way for the required time is not, as 
a general rule, sufficient to give rise to the presump-
tion of a grant. Hence, generally some circum-
stance or act, in addition to, or in connection with, 
the use of the way, tending to indicate that the 
use of the way was not merely permissive is required 
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to establish a right by prescription. This rule seems 
specially applicable to uninclosed land surrounding 
a church, schoolhouse, or other similar building. 
Moreover, in property of this class, of a semipubli,c 
character, the usual liberality in permitting it to 
be used in all ways not detrimental to its use by the 
owner must be taken into consideration." 
In the case of Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497,71 Pac. 
(2d) 646, at Page 651 the Court states: 
uln this state, where large bodies of privately 
owned land are open and uninclosed, it is a matter 
of common knowledge that the owners do not ob-
ject to persons passing over them for their accom-
modation and convenience, and many such roads 
are made and used by neighbors and others. Under 
these circumstances it would be against reason and 
justice to hold that a person so using a way over 
lands could acquire any permanent right, unless his 
intention to do so was known to the owner, or so 
plainly apparent from acts that knowledge should 
be imputed to him. Waller v. Hidlebrecht, 295 Ill. 
116, 128 N.E. 807; Evans v. Bullock, 260 Ky. 214, 
84 S.W. (2d) 26; Shroer v. Brooks, 204 Mo. App. 
567, 224 S.W. 53; Bridwell v. Arkansas Power & 
Light Co., 191 Ark. 227, 85 S.W. (2d) 712; I 
Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 478." 
Our Court in the case of Dahl v. Roach, 76 Ut. 74, 
287 Pac. 622, at Page 623 of the Pacific Reporter states: 
uPlaintiff makes no claim that the owner of 
the servient estate was ever notified that plaintiff 
claimed a right to travel over or use the way in con-
troversy. Nothing was ever said at any time to the 
owner of the servient estate that plaintiff did claim 
:l) 
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such a right. The evidence on behalf of defendants 
is to the effect that no right was ever granted to 
plaintiff to use such way for any purpose whatever. 
Moreover, the proof by plaintiff's own witness, of 
the use by plaintiff of defendant Jeremy's land, does 
not show that in driving cattle to or over said 
premises, or in driving wagons or other vehicles 
thereover, they were confined to any particular 
strip or portion of Jeremy's land. In fact, the testi-
mony fails to sbow a continuous and exclusive use 
of the right of tl/ay not only for the prescriptive 
period, but for any length of time whatever." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In the case of Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Ut. 481, 39 Pac. 
(2d) 1070, the Court at Page 1072 of the Pacific Reporter 
states as follows: 
((Before a right of way can be acquired by pre-
scription, the use for the prescriptive period must 
be peaceable, continuous, open, adverse as of right, 
and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the 
plaintiff and his grantors and predecessors in inter-
est .... 
uA twenty-year use alone of a way is not suf-
ficient to establish an easement. Mere use of a road-
way opened by a land owner for his own purpose 
will be presumed permissive. An antagonistic or 
adverse use of a way cannot spring from a permis-
sive use. A prescriptive title must be acquired ad-
versely. It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a 
license or mere neighborly acccnnmodation. Adverse 
user is the antithesis of permissive user. If the use 
is accompanied by any recognition in express terms 
or by implication of a right in the landowner to stop 
such use now or at some time in the future, the use 
is not adverse." (Emphasis added.) 
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In the light of the principle announced by our court, 
it is of particular note that the manager of the Howell Live-
stock Company, Cannon, for all the years from 1926 
through 1932, when requested by Moss to observe the rights 
of the Deseret Live Stock, states that he accordingly either 
((passed the buck," or he urged his sheep along just as fast 
as he could. The witness, Neff, who managed the intervener 
corporation from its incorporation in 1921 through 1926, 
states that he never at any time talked with any person 
about the use of the way, nor does he speak of having at 
any time seen or contacted any of the agents of the plaintiff 
corporation. Other witnesses of the defendants and 
interveners, as we have set out before, always gave 
excuses, for instance, the claim of one herder that 
his sheep had sore feet and he wanted to keep them up 
above and Moss then gave him permission to go up above. 
'Never at any time, even as to the defendant Sharp, 
has there been a clear assertion of any right to go through 
that territory over the lands of the plaintiff corporation. 
The strongest assertion that the defendant ever made was 
that he would follow the trail as it had been historically fol-
lowed by his predecessors. 
In the Ohio case of Board of Education of Pultney 
Township, Belmont County, v. Nichol, 46 N.E. (2d) 872, 
is a case in which the defendant, Nichol, had lands which 
surrounded a large uninclosed tract owned by the School 
Board and over which tract the defendant had, for many 
years, that is, for more than twenty-one years, crossed at 
various points and wherever convenient to him in driving 
to and from his lands and in crossing the said school lands 
and grazing the same, and for such other and various pur-
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poses as would be convenient to him in the use of his own 
lands. By reason of all such acts he claimed a right or ease-
ment to use all of the said lands by reason of the adverse 
character of his own use. At page 877 the court states: 
((Now, as to the claim of defendant, E. W. 
Nichol, of a right and easement across the whole 
parcel, his testimony convinces us that he has shown 
no right by prescription to the use thereof; that his 
use was a casual use, and nothing other than the use 
which the general public would make of it, a per-
missive use, which could not ripen into a prescrip-
tive right. He did not follow a beaten path, but 
crossed the land wherever convenient. While there 
is no evidence of a roadway thereover except to the 
school building yet it is undisputed that defendant, 
E. W. Nichol, did travel across it, but not by reason 
of necessity, as he had highway access to his lands, 
and such a road as was situated on tract one ended 
at and was used only for the purpose of ingress and 
egress from the school building, and he used it only 
as the public generally might use it as a way of 
convenience without the knowledge of plaintiff 
board. Certainly by such use he would acquire no 
prescriptive right to do so. 
ult is a matter of common knowledge that 
rural school properties are used by the public gen-
erally for private uses, passageways to adjoining 
lands, and for public functions, and their use differs 
as a matter of custom, from the public use of private 
property. The public attitude is that school prop-
erty is public property. 
uw e believe that the rule applicable to his 
claim of a right and easement across the whole parcel 
was announced in the case of Kilburn & Another v. 
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Adams, 48 Mass. 33, 7 Mete. 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754, 
and quoted by this court in Davidson v. Dunn, 16 
Ohio App. 263: (The rule we think is, that where 
a tract of land, attached to a public building, such 
as a meeting house, town house, school house, and 
the like, and occupied with such house, is designedly 
left open and unenclosed, for convenience or orna-
ment, the passage of persons over it, in common 
with those for whose use it is appropriated, is, in 
general, to be regarded as permissive and under an 
implied license, and not adverse. Such a use is not 
inconsistent with the only use which the proprietors 
think fit to make of it; and therefore, until they 
think proper to enclose it, such use is not adverse, 
and will not preclude them from enclosing it, when 
other views of the interest of the proprietors render 
it proper to do so. And though an adjacent pro-
prietor may make such use of the open land more 
frequently than another, yet the same rule will 
apply, unless there be some decisive· act, indicating 
a separate and exclusive use, under a claim of 
right. * * * ' 
((In the case of Davidson v. Dunn, supra, this 
court said in paragraphs two and three of the sylla-
bus: 
(( (Continuous use of a passageway over an un-
inclosed vacant lot in a city by the owner of an 
adjoining lot in going to and from the residence 
thereon to the street will not ripen into an ease-
ment by prescription, unless such passageway is of 
such a permanent construction as to give notice of 
a claim of right. 
(((The making of a beaten path across an un-
inclosed vacant city lot by walking from the resi-
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dence on an ad joining lot to the street and return, 
and at times spreading cinders or ashes thereon, is 
not such infringement by the owner of the adjoin-
ing lot the rights of the owner of the vacant lot as 
will give notice of an adverse claim.' 
nA similar conclusion is reached in this case, 
and is supported by the case of Schulenbarger v. 
Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 843, 845, 35 
L.R.A., N.S., 941, which holds: (It can hardly be 
contended that it was ever the intent of the law to 
hold that a private easement could be .created over 
the lands of another at a time when they were open 
and uninclosed.' " 
It is apparent from the evidence that ninety-five per 
cent of all of the lands in this area are public domain and 
open and available to all of the public who care to cross the 
same. The use of that public domain and the use of all of 
the lands, the fee title to which is owned by the plaintiff, 
during the period it has been in the government, has been 
permitted to be used by the public by way of government 
license and no right could be established as against the gov-
ernment. These lands of the plaintiff, therefore, being ad-
jacent to the federal lands, the right of the various users 
to cross the same is at all times considered a permissive right 
until there is such a clear assertion of a right by the person 
who claims an interest in the land that we must consider 
the fee owner to have knowledge of such asserted right. 
There is nothing in any of the acts, statements or evidence 
introduced in this case which shows that the interveners 
had at any time made a clear assertion to the use of the 
lands of the plaintiff as a use as of right. Their evidence 
that the officers of the plaintiff .company had told them to 
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stay off their lands, to keep on the trail, to keep below the 
road, had posted signs at Burnt Springs is of itself sufficient 
to establish the fact that any use by the intervener would 
be subject to the rights of the plaintiff and could be termi-
nated by the plaintiff at any time. This direction on the 
part of plaintiff's agents is sufficient to stop the period 
within which the defendant could attempt to show its 
twenty-one year's use. These acts toll any period the inter-
vener may claim to establish its prescriptive period and 
such conversations having definitely taken place in the 
thirties, we again urge this court to establish the fact that 
there had been no adverse use for the prescriptive period 
of twenty-one years. 
In the case of Powell vs. Bagg, 74 Mass. 441, at page 
443, Justice Bigelow says: 
HFrom such use of an easement for twenty 
years, the law will presume a non-appearing grant. 
But before the lapse of that period, if the owner of 
the land, by a verbal act on the premises in which 
easement is claimed, resists the exercise of the right 
and denies its existence, the presumption of a grant 
is rebutted, his acquiescence in the right claimed is 
disproved, and the essential elements of a title to an 
easement by adverse use are shown not to exist. On 
this point, the instructions given to the jury were 
defective, and tended to mislead them in applying 
the evidence to the rule of law, on which the title 
of the defendant to the easement depended. They 
should have been told, and this is the precise point 
on which we sustain the exceptions, that if it was 
proved that, before the expiration of twenty years 
from the time when the right was first claimed, the 
plaintiff, being on the land upon which the de-
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fendant entered for the purpose of subverting the 
soil, there forbade him to exercise his right, and 
ordered his servants to desist, it was sufficient to 
warrant the jury in finding that the plaintiff had 
not acquiesced in the adverse use of the easement, 
and that the defendants had not acquired a title 
thereto." 
We have heretofore cited the case of Lindsay Land 
and Live Stock Company vs. Churnos, supra, to the effect 
that there must be a certainty of the line or course of any 
road or trail which would be claimed and that neither an 
individual nor the public could acquire a right to use or 
pass over a tract of land generally, but only in a certain 
way and line. This principle is further established as an-
nounced in 1 Thompson on Real Prop~rty, Page 726, 
where it is stated: 
uTo declare a prescriptive right of way by con-
sent and uninterrupted use, the use must relate 
strictly to the identical land over which the right is 
claimed. It was said in one case that a road can not 
be established with a variance of ten or twenty feet; 
... Thus, a right of way by prescription can not be 
acquired to wander generally and at random over 
the property of another. Such right can be acquired, 
only by the use of a definite and well-defined 
route." 
A good analogy of this principle would be that of air-
planes traveling at a low level in approaching an airport. 
The case in mind is Smith vs. New Engla·nd Aircraft Com-
pany, 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 69 A.L.R. 300, at 
Page 3 9 3 of the Northeastern Report where the court says: 
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uThe final point to be determined is whether 
the circumstances are such as to require injunctive 
relief. Upon that point the nature of the trespasses 
shown is important. Although there appear to have 
been a considerable number of trespasses by aircraft, 
it seems plain that they are not in the same place 
as to linear space or altitude. In the nature of things 
the flights of aircraft must vary with wind and 
load. No prescriptive right to any particular way 
of passage could be acquired in these conditions." 
It is clear from the evidence we have detailed in our 
statement of facts and in this argument that where the 
witnesses for the interveners show that the course the 
sheep had followed varied over an area many miles in 
width, where the wanderings of the sheep themselves from 
one time to another had taken them to various patches of 
feed, and that the persons had not attempted to keep the 
course to any certain path, but on the .contrary had inten-
tionally varied that path generally down through the 
country, that there has never been established any path or 
route direct by boundary or otherwise, which could permit 
the court at any time to consider a path, trail, or road in 
this area. 
We submit further that the evidence as to the road 
claimed through the upper country will not sustain that 
road as a county road or a public road which would have 
been reserved under the patents of the United States to 
the State of Utah, and from the State of Utah to the plain-
tiff. This, for the reason that the road has never received 
the dignity of a county road, never received the attention 
of the county, and classified by all of the witnesses as a 
turnout road used only when the old Lincoln Highway 
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became impassable for the area from Burnt Springs to 
Timpie Point. This road did not receive the dignity of any 
description on the official county plat, it was not known by 
the County Commissioner, Matthews, who was in charge 
of that area, the witnesses, Hogan and Severe, who had 
ranches and who had worked out there for years, never 
knew of any such road, and most important of all is the 
fact that there was no witness who testified as to any such 
old road, who stated that he was able to go out on the 
ground at the present time and determine where that road 
went. Under such circumstances the court could not at 
random select any certain point through that area several 
miles in width and determine that the road would follow at 
any particular point. 36-1-9 U.C.A. 1943 requires county 
commissioners to determine all public highways in their 
county and to prepare plats and descriptions of such roads. 
Plaintiff's Ex. uA" shows this road has never been recog-
nized by Tooele County. Further the county never put 
any work on it. All work being on the old Lincoln High-
way. 
All of these cases cited indicate the burden upon the 
person asserting the easement, either public or private, but 
particularly when private to describe the easement by 
meets and bounds of particularity, and to determine by 
exact proof and establish by the burden of the proof the 
location of any such claimed easement, and if the same is so 
indefinite that it is not evidenced on the ground and no 
witness can now point to the place where that road tra-
versed, then the court itself has no evidence from which 
it can determine where any such a road would have been. 
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We have pointed out to the Court in this argument 
the facts and the law upon which we have claimed that 
there was no evidence to sustain a finding of the Court 
that there had been a use by the interveners sufficient to 
ripen into a private easement, and that there had been no 
sufficient use by the public to establish a County road. 
Further, we would like to submit to the Court the case of 
the Town of Bethel v. Pruet, 250 Ill. 162; 74 N.E. 111. At 
Page 113 of the N.E. Reporter the Court states: 
It is said that the court erred in giving to the 
jury the seventeenth instruction, which was given 
for the appellee, to the effect that a prescriptive 
right cannot be acquired to pass over a tract of land 
generally, but such right must be confined to a 
specific way, or definite, certain, and precise line. 
The instruction correctly stated the law, as the same 
is laid down in the text-books and authorities. Ellitt 
in his work on Roads and Streets (2d Ed., Sec. 176) 
says: ((The public cannot acquire a prescriptive 
right to pass over land generally, and, where a high-
way is claimed by prescription, a certain and well-
defined line of travel must be shown; but a slight 
deviation on account of some obstacle will not af-
fect the right. It is sufficient if the line of travel 
has remained substantially unchanged, although at 
times there may have been a slight deviation in 
order to avoid (bad roads' or temporary obstruc-
tions." In the case at bar there was testimony tend-
ing to show that the travel which was shown to 
have passed over the strip here in controversy was 
due principally to the fact that there was a pond 
in one part of the highway and a mudhole in an-
other part, which made it necessary for persons 
traveling along the highway north of appellee's land 
to diverge from the main highway in order to avoid 
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these obstructions. In Township of Madison v. 
Gallagher, 159 Ill. 105,42 N.E. 316, we said: ((The 
prescriptive right must be confined to a specific or 
definite, certain, and precise line or way." In 
O'Connell v. Chicago Terminal Railroad Co., 184 
Ill. 308, 56 N.E. 355, we said: ((Nothing is better 
settled than that a highway by prescription is not 
created by public travel over the land generally, but 
that the line of travel must be within definite lim-
its." These limits may often be defined by fences 
on side of the road, but they may be defined other-
wise than by fences. In the case at bar the testimony 
tends to show that there were two roadways, one 
north and one south, and that between the two was 
a growth of underbrush. The evidence is not clear 
that the turning aside from the main road and 
passing over the strip in question were not for the 
mere temporary purpose of avoiding the obstruc-
tions referred to. As was said in Town of Brushy 
Mound v. McClintock, 150 Ill. 129, 36 N.E. 976: 
((It is unreasonable to suppose that road authorities 
would claim, or a property holder suspect that a 
public highway was to be located on the tortuous 
line of the road in question." The divergence of 
travel here over the strip in question made the high-
way at the point indicated a tortuous, instead of 
a straight and direct, one. The fact of the con-
struction of the hedge fence at the point named by 
the appellee is a strong circumstance in support of 
appellant's theory of the case, but it was only one 
circumstance to be taken in to consideration by the 
jury in connection with all the other circumstances 
developed by the evidence. The evidence was con-
flicting as to the extent of the travel over the strip 
in question, and under 'the instructions it was a 
matter for the jury to determine. 
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We submit that the above citation fully supports our 
contention that there was no evidence from which another 
public road can be found by the Court east of the old 
Lincoln Highway. All of the witnesses described it as a 
uturn-out" used only when the Lincoln Highway was im-
passable. Some of the witnesses indicated that there was 
at times a lake covering the old Lincoln Highway in the 
north end in wet seasons, and only at that time would they 
turn out to the east. Any use of any upper turn-out, 
where the course is shown by all of the evidence, physical 
and verbal, to consist of a great number of trails and roads, 
is so general and so inconsistent with a well-defined road 
as to preclude any determination of a well-defined way 
dedicated to the public. We submit the above quoted au-
thority as conclusive on that matter. 
For the same reason, this wandering, fragmentary, and I' 
1 
indefinite use of an area several miles wide by the inter-
veners, with no trailing evidence as to where and on what 
private lands of the interveners they ever cross, is so in-
definite that it cannot ripen into a prescriptive easement 
or way, or a profit a prendre, as illustrated by the above 
Illinois case. 
Further, in :finding No. 19, a trail 2000' in width as a 
public trail is found by the Court; and in finding No. 
20 the Court determines that a road 2,000 feet in width 
was necessary and reasonable for the public in trailing; 1 
and, whereas, in Finding No. 15 the Court determines that I 
the intervener has under a claim of use, both as a private 
easement and as a public trail, followed a road and trail 
3,000 feet in width uand that the public trail was as wide r 
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as the sheep were being spread," we submit that under 
these findings the Court has made the issue so inconsistent 
that the findings cannot support the decree of a private 
easement 3,000 feet in width-this for the reason that the 
Court having found such trail to be a public trail uso far 
as the sheep were spread" there can be no private easement 
on a public trJil. Sullivan vs. Condas, supra, is conclusive 
as to this point. 
We submit the above authority of our own Court, the 
Illinois Court, and others cited, are conclusive that any 
such a varying, indefinite and general course cannot be 
established or claimed as a public trail, and we submit that 
both propositions of the interveners must fail. 
As further authority on this point we submit the fol-
lowing from the case of Matthiessen v. Grand, 92 Cal. App. 
504, 268 Pac. 675 at Page 678 in which the Court states: 
Yet in view of the uncertainty of the location 
or course of this ancient trail ten miles in length, 
which meanders aimlessy through the midst of a 
large cattle ranch, running over hills and down 
dales, sometimes following a river ·canyon, clamber-
ing along an adjacent bluff, or skirting across a con-
venient mesa, with no attempt to definitely describe 
its course by measurements or survey; with con-
vincing evidence of numerous substantial changes 
in the course, in spite of the defendants' contradic-
tion of these changes; with proof of continuous 
maintenance by the owner of locked gates across 
the way, the evidence in the present case scarcely 
measures up to the specific requirements of the law 
with respect to the establishment of an easement by 
prescription. Upon the contrary, such circum-
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stances strongly rebut the presumption created by 
the mere use of the roadway. The right to the un-
hampered use and enjoyment of one's own property, 
which is not in conflict with the rights acquired by 
others, may not be thus recklessly destroyed. To 
establish an easement to a right of way by prescrip-
tion, the evidence of adverse possession should be 
clear and positive, and the requirements should be 
strictly construed. 9 R.C.L. 782, Sec. 40. 
The line of travel over a roadway which is 
claimed by prescription may not be a shifting 
course, but must be certain and definite. Slight de-
viations from the accustomed route will not defeat 
an easement, but substantial changes which break 
the continuity of the course of travel will destroy 
the claim to prescriptive rights. Vestal v. Young, 
147 Cal. 721, 82 P. 383; Allen v. San Jose Land & 
W. Co., 92 Cal. 138,28 P. 215, 15 L.R.A. 93; Oliver 
v. Agasse, 132 Cal. 297, 64 P. 401; 19 C.J. 899 
Sec. 77. A change of 2 0 feet in the location of a 
ditch has been held to defeat an easement. Vestal 
v. Young, supra; Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal. 
App. 119, 180 P. 67. Although manifestly the dis-
tance to which a roadway may be changed without 
destroying an easement will be determined some-
what by the character of the land over which it 
passes, together with the value, improvements, and 
purposes to which the land is adapted. The mainte-
nance of gates by the owner, across the roadway, 
when such gates are always kept locked, even though 
keys may be supplied to the neighbors as a matter 
of accommodation, is substantial proof of permis-
sive use. Quinn v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 454, 11 P. 746; 
Heertan v. Bevans, 51 Cal. Ap. 277, 196 P. 802; 
Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 
843, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 941, note. We are of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
83 
opinion that the evidence in the present case is in-
sufficient to support the findings establishing pre-
scriptive title, in view of the foregoing well-estab-
lished rules of law. It therefore becomes necessary 
to reverse the judgment for lack of evidence in 
that regard. 
In the case of Romans 11. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 14 
N.W. 2nd at Page 486 the Court says in part as follows: 
It is a well-known fact that many thousands 
of homeowners have no boundary fences and that 
adjoining owners occasionally trespass on their 
neighbors' lands in cutting grass, trimming hedges, 
and the like. Such harmless trespasses are com-
mitted upon the well-founded assumption that ordi-
narily a neighbor will acquiesce in and consent to 
them. Such forebearances are expected of neigh-
bors. They make for good relations between them. 
As said of the acts referred to in the Bolton case, 
such trespasses are not done with any intention of 
acquiring adverse rights and are acquiesced in by 
the owner without intending that such rights should 
be established. If such trespasses should be held to 
constitute a basis for prescriptive rights, every ad-
joining landowner in the cases mentioned would 
acquire, after 15 years, an easement in his neigh-
bors' lands to the extent of such trespass. This 
shows the absurdity of allowing an easement in such 
cases. Under such circumstances, something more 
than such occasional uses of land should be required 
to give rise to prescriptive rights. The trespasser 
should be required to show by some additional acts 
that the entry is hostile and under claim of right, 
and thus run up his flag of hostile claim, so as to 
warn the owner that, if he acquiesces, adverse rights 
will be established against him. 
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We cite further the case of O'Connell v. Chicago 
Terminal Transfer R. Co., 56 N.E. Reporter, at Page 359, 
in which the Court says in part as follows: 
The general course of the alleged highway prior 
to 1894 was considerably south of the macadam 
road built in that year. Different diverging lines of 
travel, none of which are in use for the requisite 
period of 2 0 years, cannot be united in order to 
make such period. Gentleman v. Soule, 32 Ill. 271. 
Nothing is better settled than that a highway by 
prescription is not created by public travel over 
the land generally, but that the line of travel must 
be within definite limits. These limits, and the loca-
tion of the way or track are often precisely defined 
by fences on the sides of the road. Town of Madison 
v. Gallagher, supra; Gentleman v. Soule, supra; 
City of Ottawa v. Yentzer, supra. Whatever use 
of the road was shown by the testimony in case 
seems to have been a use thereof by a few individ-
uals in the neighborhood for particular purposes, 
and not by the public generally. Such use by a few 
individuals does not constitute such use by the pub-
lic as creates title by prescription. 
Conclusive of the fact that there could be neither a 
public trail nor a private easement over the course is the 
following quotation from Finding of Fact No. 15, wherein 
it is said: 
HTha t said use has been open and notorious and 
that the private owner of said lands actually knew 
at all times that said use was being made of said 
lands; that the trailing and grazing of said sheep 
over said lands and along said trail was done by 
Howells Livestock Company, Inc. and its predeces-
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claim of right of a private easement, and also that 
they were following a public trail or road and that 
the public trail was as wide as the sheep were being 
spread." 
We submit that this finding destroys any possibility of 
a private easement because it admits the use was as of one 
of the public. We submit that any such use as one of the 
public under the authorities we have heretofore indicated 
is clearly a permissive use, could never be adverse, and there 
never could be any claim of a private easement. Any decree 
intending to support a private easement upon a finding 
that the use was by the intervener as one of the public is 
entirely contrary to and without support in the law. 
We desire to call the court's attention to Finding No. 
19, wherein the court finds that a width of 2000 feet was 
a reasonable width for a road for the trailing of sheep, and 
in Finding No. 20, wherein the court finds that a road 
2,000 feet in width was and is reasonably necessary for the 
trailing of sheep through the area. There is no reason, there-
fore, in the evidence or the findings, to support a conclu-
sion or decree which establishes a road 3000 feet in width. 
We submit that there could not be any proof of a 
private easement in intervener because the evidence affirm-
atively shows, and the finding of the court shows, that the 
intervener claimed the right to use the trail as a member 
of the public, its use therefore being permissive its proof 
fails entirely as to an exclusive use in intervener for 21 
years. Further, that there was no definite way used by the 
intervener or defendants. In fact the evidence is to the 
contrary and shows that they tried to avoid the path made 
by the preceding herd. 
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POINT NO. III 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE, PLEADING OR 
FINDING FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD 
FIND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT AT BURNT 
SPRINGS IN FAVOR OF INTERVENER. 
In the cross complaint of the defendants, Sharp, para-
graph 8 states that Burnt Springs is located on Deseret Live-
stock Company's property; that the water is suitable for 
watering livestock and for use by human beings; that no 
one has ever used the waters except the defendants, the 
interverners and other members of the public. In para-
graph 13 it is alleged that the trail is adjacent to Burnt 
Springs and that the trail and roadway and the waters at 
Burnt Springs have been used by the defendants, the inter-
veners and the public for watering purposes. In paragraph 
15 it is alleged that Burnt Springs was in existence when 
the lands of the plaintiff were public domain, and that 
Burnt Springs was used by the defendants, interverner and 
the public generally, for trailing and watering stock, and 
that the Federal government conveyed lands to the state 
of Utah subject to the right of the public to use the water 
at Burnt Springs. 
In the complaint in intervention it is alleged in para-
graph 10 that Burnt Springs is located on Deseret Live-
stock Company's property; that the waters form a chan-
nel and there is a one-half second foot of water in this 
natural channel. Paragraph 11 sets forth that the waters 
for fifty years have been and still are suitable for livestock 
and for human beings. Paragraph 12 sets forth that none 
L 
li ., Jl 
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of the waters have been appropriated except by intervener, 
its tenants, the defendants, and the intervener and pre-
decessors appropriated and used the waters of Burnt Springs 
in 1895 while the land was public domain. In paragraph 
15 it is alleged that the trail is adjacent to Burnt Springs 
and that the trail and roadway and the water at and from 
Burnt Springs had been used and appropriated by inter-
vener for stock watering and for human use. In paragraph 
17 it is set out that the trail and roadway and Burnt 
Springs were in existence at the time the plaintiff's lands 
were public domain, and that Burnt Springs was ap-
propriated and used by the predecessors of intervener, and 
the Federal government in 1900 conveyed said lands to the 
state of Utah subject to the right of intervener and its 
predecessors to use the water at Burnt Springs, and that 
the state of Utah conveyed the lands to the plaintiff sub-
ject to the right of intervener and its predecessors to use 
the water of Burnt Springs. 
From these pleadings it is clearly set forth that what-
ever rights the intervener and defendants have in Burnt 
Springs are based upon reservations appearing in the patents 
from the United States to the state of Utah, and from the 
state of Utah to the plaintiffs. It is also clear in this com-
plaint that the rights of the intervener and defendants are 
limited to a claimed appropriation or right to use the waters. 
There is nothing at any point in either the cross complaint 
or the complaint in intervention, or any amendments 
thereto, which at any time sets forth that in conjunction 
with the rights to use the waters at Burnt Springs the inter-
vener or defendants ever entered upon any lands of the 
plaintiff to reach the waters; There is no allegation that 
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the waters rose and disappeared entirely upon the lands of 
the plaintiff. There is the allegation that the waters formed 
a natural channel. That channel, as far as the pleadings 
are concerned, may or may not have crossed some of the 
lands of the plaintiff. There is no allegation in the cross 
complaint or the complaint in intervention as to which 
lands of the plaintiff Burnt Springs is located upon-
whether it is upon lands involved in the complaint or other 
lands. In the stipulation as to title, to which we have 
referred many times heretofore, it was agreed that the only 
rights of intervener and defendants would be those which 
they could show as reserved by the provisions of the patents 
from the United States Government and the state of Utah. 
In their pleadings, as we have indicated heretofore, the 
intervener and defendants have set forth that the rights 
to the waters of Burnt Springs were reserved by the provi-
sions of the patents from the United States and the state 
of Utah. Certainly any attempt to assert a private right 
at Burnt Springs is entirely inconsistent with the stipulation 
and with the pleadings, and any judgment based upon 
these pleadings, giving a private easement to lands in or 
around Burnt Springs, finds no support whatsoever in the 
pleadings or the evidence. The pleadings do not assert a 
right to cross any of the lands of the plaintiff to reach the 
waters of Burnt Springs. There is nothing to show in the 
pleadings where the waters of Burnt Springs were used; 
for all it appears, they could have been used off of the lands 
of the plaintiff and on the public domain. We have here, 
therefore, a situation in which the court has decreed to the 
intervener a right established by prescription in the water-
ing of 11,000 sheep, to spread the sheep along the banks 
of said stream from Burnt Springs to a width of 5 00 feet 
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to the north and 500 feet to the south, and to spread said 
sheep along said stream from the headwaters of said Burnt 
Springs to a point 800 feet distant from said headwaters. 
(Third paragraph, page 3 of Decree.) This decreed ease-
ment or right is not supported by any pleading of inter-
vener or defendants and particularly there is no claim or 
description in their pleadings of any right or the boundaries 
or direction or course of the right to get onto plaintiff's 
lands. 
We submit that this provision of the decree is not 
supported by the pleadings, is not supported by the evi-
dence, and is in fact contrary to law. We have heretofore 
pointed out to the court that the pleadings do not describe 
or even claim an easement over the land to water at Burnt 
Springs. There is no course mentioned in the pleadings. 
There is no place of watering mentioned in the pleadings. 
The only mention made is that'Burnt Springs is adjacent 
to the trail or roadway. Nothing is said of a right to cross 
the lands of the plaintiff to reach the springs. Nothing is 
said as to where that right would commence, where it 
would end, and nothing is said as to where the animals or 
human beings would secure the waters from Burnt Springs. 
We have further shown to the court that this right 
to use the waters at Burnt Springs is claimed to have been 
reserved under the patents of the Federal and state govern-
ments, and therefore the right to the waters would be a 
public right and a private right could not be initiated 
under pleadings setting forth such a public right. If the 
right is in the public, any use by an individual must neces-
sarily be deemed permissive. That principal was clearly 
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announced in the case of Thornley Land & Livestock Com-
pany vs. Morga.n Brothers Land & Livestock Company, 
81 Utah 317, 17 P. 2d 826, where the court states: 
((While a public road may be so established, the 
use by individual persons in common with the public 
generally is regarded as permissive, and by such 
common use no individual person can acquire a 
right by prescription as against the owner of the 
fee." 
The evidence in the case clearly shows that while this 
land was unenclosed,-and that was the condition for all 
of the years prior to 1948-the waters at Burnt Springs 
were used by numerous individuals as they trailed through 
the country. In this connection, we desire to point out to 
the court that if there is any doctrine well established in 
this area it is that where persons travel through and across 
the open unenclosed desert area of this state, crossing the 
unenclosed lands of any individual certainly not more often 
than twice a year, such crossing is deemed permissive, and 
certainly any person in that desert area taking waters will 
be deemed to have been taking these waters by permission, 
unless clear and unequivocal assertion of a right to use 
the water is made. 
As to the right to use the water at Burnt Springs, there 
is not any place in the evidence any statement or claim by 
any individual that he had ever advised any employee or 
officer of the plaintiff that he was watering there under a 
claim of right. No conversation, no discussion of any kind 
is to be found in the evidence relative to the right to water 
at Burnt Springs. The pleadings assert that Burnt Springs 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
91 
is not included within the boundaries of any claimed 
public road or trail. They allege it is adjacent to the trail. 
There is not at any time raised in the evidence any instance 
wherein any conversation, any observation or any knowl-
edge was ever had that the defedants or intervener were 
watering at Burnt Springs. The entire evidence as to the 
use of Burnt Springs by the intervener or defendants 1s 
found in the following excerpts: 
The witness Samuel Neff, at pages 45 and 46 of his 
deposition, states that he watered sheep at Burnt Springs. 
At page 48 he said he had horses drink out of the spring. 
At page 50 he states that as they would pass the spring 
they would water and trail on. At page 51 he states that 
other users of the trail watered at Burnt Springs. At page 
52 he states that they were never interfered with in water-
ing at the spring and had never had a conversation con-
cerning it with anyone. At page 57 he states that his sheep 
watered at Burnt Springs in 1911. At page 59 he says he 
watered at Burnt Springs. At page 62 Neff describes the 
appearance of the spring, detailing nothing about the use. 
At page 191 of the transcript, Jaspar Brown, a witness 
of the defendants, states that in 1920 the Western Pacific 
made a channel at Burnt Springs to run into a reservoir and 
to pipe the water over to their Dell station, and that they 
made a ravine to this pond, and that Deseret Livestock 
Company had made changes in the course of the stream 
where they plowed some furrows and scattered the water 
out over the land. At page 192 he states that Deseret Live 
Stock Company had put up dams in one of the ravines. 
Jaspar Brown, testifying as to his own use of the water of 
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Burnt Springs, states at page 194 that for fifty years he 
watered sheep at Burnt Springs, and at page 201 of the 
transcript he states that the sheep were watered winter 
and fall as he was passing through. 
Joseph Stillman, a witness for the defendants and in-
tervener, states at page 230 that he himself watered his 
sheep at Burnt Springs as he passed through the country. 
At page 232 of the transcript Stillman describes the spring 
as a half circle, with the water gathering at a point below 
the springs. At page 234 Stillman states he watered at 
Burnt Springs. 
Earl Palmer, a district grazer and witness for the 
defendants and intervener, states at p. 258 that the waters 
of the spring are darned and are gathered into a channel 1 
from the dam. At p. 265 of the transcript he states that 
he has seen the sheep of the intervener Howells, a corpora- I~ 
tion, watered at Burnt Springs. 
The witness, Dayton, for the defendants (one of their 
sheep herders) states at page 308 of the transcript that he 
ha~ watered sheep at Burnt Springs, and at page 316 states 
that they were given permission to water their sheep at 
the Deseret Livestock Company ranch at Iosepa. 
Peter A. Jensen, the foreman for the defendants, 
testifies at pages 3 3 7, 3 3 9 and 3 52 of the transcript, and 
states, ccwe have watered at Burnt Springs." The witness I: 
Clark, one of the sheep herders of the defendants, states at 
pages 366 and 369 that they watered at Burnt Springs. It 
is particularly interesting to note that the testimony of 
all of the witnesses indicates that Burnt Springs is west 
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of the present main county highway. The witness Peter 
Jensen states at page 3 53 of the record that his herds 
never got west of that county road as they proceeded from 
Timpie to the losepa ranch. From all of this testi-
mony the court can clearly see that at no place in the entire 
record have the defendants or interveners at any time 
stated where they watered, how they watered, what land 
they were on or how they got to the water or any point 
on the water, at Burnt Springs. 
Their witnesses have indicated that the waters from 
Burnt Springs travel a distance well in excess of a mile. One 
witness indicated that he had not been able to see far 
enough to the west to see just how far that water traveled. 
An indication merely that these individuals watered from 
the waters of Burnt Springs, or watered at Burnt Springs, 
is no description as to the point, trail, path or roadway at 
which this watering was done. In the first place it would 
be presumed that in any watering the persons using the 
waters would do so lawfully and there would not be any 
trespass involved. 
From this testimony it becomes immediately clear to 
the court that Judge Ellett could not from judicial 
knowledge, or without some testimony to justify his deter-
mination, state what territory was covered in watering at 
Burnt Springs. Certainly there is nothing in the evidence 
to justify any findings or any decree establishing an ease-
ment 1000 feet wide and 800 feet in length at Burnt 
Springs. The testimony shows that there have been dams 
constructed. The pictures show that the plaintiffs have 
constructed upon their lands a large reservoir. The testi-
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mony shows that the waters have been spread out by dams 
and ditches over a large area of this land of the plaintiffs 
at Burnt Springs, and that this situation has existed for 
many years. The testimony of Neff and others shows that 
the course of any water is now made by means of an 
artificial channel. 
The cases and authority we have cited in support of 
our Point No. II set out the principle that any person 
claiming a private easement over the lands of another must 
set forth that easement in his complaint so definitely that 
a person can locate it on the ground and it will support in 
detail any decree or judgment entered thereon. These 
cases show that such easement must be defined by use, by 
description of the place of the use in the pleadings, with 
evidence to support that use and to clearly show the 
boundaries of the use, that it was adverse and that under 
these circumstances the party claiming the easement had 
made known to the land owner his adverse claims through-
out a period of twenty-one years. None of these require-
ments have been met by the interveners or defendants in 
their evidence or pleadings and as a matter of law their 
pleadings are contrary and conflicting in setting up :1 
public right as to preclude any private easement. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE EASEMENT IN GROSS WHICH THE 
COURT DECREED TO INTERVENER IS EX-
CESSIVE AND SO INDEFINITE THAT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THE JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE SET ASIDE. THIS STATEMENT APPLIES TO 
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THE AREA AT BURNT SPRINGS AS WELL AS 
THE OTHER POINTS, AND INCLUDES THE 
FURTHER PROPOSITION THAT THERE WAS 
NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN AN EASEMENT 
IN GROSS. 
In Volume I of Thompson on Real Property, Perm. 
Ed., at page 738, paragraph 451, it is stated: 
uAn easement acquired by prescription is lim-
ited to a reasonable and usual enjoyment thereof. 
The servient owner is entitled to all the rights and 
benefits of ownership consistent with the easement. 
So there can be no prescriptive easement so large as 
to preclude the ordinary uses of the land by the 
owner. No one can be considered, for instance, to 
have a right of property worth holding in land over 
which the whole world has the privilege to walk and 
to deposit itself at pleasure. It would seem that a 
claim in the nature of an easement incapable of 
judicial control and restriction could not be sus-
tained by prescription. The rule is well settled that 
a highway by prescription is not created by public 
travel over the land generally, but that the line of 
travel must be within definite limits." (Italics ours.) 
We submit under the principle announced by Thomp-
son, supra, that the decree of Judge Ellett that the inter-
veners had an easement in gross 3000 feet in width con-
stitutes a confiscation of all of the lands of the plaintiff 
throughout three townships, and violates and is entirely 
contrary to the principle announced. The easement decreed 
is so indefinite that it is not subject to location upon the 
ground. In the Wyoming case of Bishop vs. Hawley, 3 3 
Wyo. 271, 238 Pac. 284, the court found that drovers used 
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a trail 500 to 1200 feet in width but decreed that as a 
matter of law the way would be limited to 100 feet in 
width stating: 
((We find that it is a general principle that, 
where such an easement is granted but not defined, 
the privilege must be a reasonable one for the pur-
pose for which it was created." 
In explaining this further we quote from Montgomery 
vs. Comers, 50 Oregon 259; 90 Pac. 674: 
rr It would be unreasonable, however, to say that, 
where loose stock being driven, travel promiscuously, 
although in a general unifortn direction, over a strip 
of land 75 to 100 yards in width, the user is therebJ' 
confined to a certain and well defined line of travel, 
and that a right of easement attaches to the whole 
width thereof, because the claim is broader than the 
reasonable necessity of the case'. The unreasonable-
ness of the asserted claim is established by the fact 
shown by this record that, at other places on this 
same trail, the thread of travel is only a few feet in 
width, being confined and limited by the nature of 
the country to such smaller latitude." 
How true this is in the principal case where the trail 
is 100 feet wide for Yz mile at Iosepa. -
At page 599 of the record, Judge Ellett, in ruling on 
plaintiff's objection to the amendment to the complaint to 
set up a profit a prendre, states: 
((It seems to me that this is just in furtherance 
of the proof that was given to the court. The')' 
claimed public right-of-way. They didn't prove it, 
but they proved-! mean a private profit a prendre 
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across there, an easement in gross, and I don't see 
that is any different than what the proof made, so 
the amendment will be permitted." (Emphasis 
added.) 
At a time in about the middle of the trial, the exact 
point the record does not disclose, Judge Ellett first sug-
gested to the defendants and intervener that in view of the 
testimony that they travelled wherever they wanted over 
a wide part through this area, wherever they might find 
better feed, by their use the defendants had acquired a 
profit a prendre to graze the lands of the plaintiff. This 
was the first any such right had ever been conceived by 
any person, and at the time it was suggested it was discussed 
by the parties off the record and in the arguments before 
Judge Ellett, and determined that there were no pleadings 
to support any such issue. As pointed out by Judge Ellett 
himself, this case was tried and presented to him under 
the theory that there was a public trail through these lands. 
The defendants and intervener never at any time conceived 
they had anything else. The court volunteered to them the 
proposition that they may have a profit a prendre, and in 
spite of the stipulation by the counsel that the only rights 
the intervener or defendants would have would be those 
that came to them by reservations in the patent, the court 
has conceived a theory of its own and proceeded without 
support of the pleadings and as a complete matter of sur-
prise to confiscate the lands of the plaintiff and donate 
them to the intervener and the defendants. Three thou-
sand feet is well in excess of a one-half mile, and a course 
three thousand feet in width, particularly in Townships 
I and 2 South, as a practical matter constitute a confisca-
tion, as we have heretofore set forth, of all of the lands of 
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the plaintiff in those townships. To show the utter fallacy 
of this determination of Judge Ellett needs only to recall 
the testimony of Pharis Johnson, who testified that there 
was once a trail out through that area, but that the trail 
might well be through greasewoods which have now grown 
up in the area and its exact location is not known. Judge 
Ellett himself said that wherever the old road was, no wit-
ness would agree with him, and we have given you that 
quotation heretofore. The fact tha~ this purported 3000 
feet profit a prendre is to follow a general course of a road 
which the court itself arbitrarily locates shows the high-
handed method employed by the court in this case. 
We desire in this connection to once again call the 
court's attention to the statement from Finding of Fact 
No. 15, wherein the court says that the ((Howells Livestock 
Company, Inc. and its predecessors in interest and defend-
ants Sharp, under the claim of right of a privat~ easement, 
and also that they were following a public trail or road 
and that the public trail was as wide as the sheep were 
being spread." We submit at the outset that this finding 
is conclusive against any claim on the part of the inter-
veners or defendants to a profit a prendre. It describes their 
use as being under claim of use of a public trail. Under all 
of the authorities, and particularly the Utah cases we have 
cited, the public use is conclusive against any private right. 
These are so inconsistent that they cannot stand, could not 
support a decree on either a public or private right, and the 
decree itself must therefore be set aside and declared a 
nullity wherein it attempts to decree to the intervener a 
private easement for trailing, and further, for the right 
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It is well to keep in mind that under the decree of Judge 
Ellett he has given to the interveners the right to graze 
any and all of the lands of plaintiff within the 3000 feet 
area wherever that might be, and specifically all of Section 
36, in Township 2 South, and Section 2, in Township 3 
South, both Range 8 West. Throughout the three months 
which could be officially designated the spring and through-
out the three months which could be officially designated 
the fall, the Court has given to intervener the right to 
graze all of the plaintiff's lands, as heretofore set forth, and 
to entirely usurp those lands for the one purpose for which 
they have value to the plaintiff, and that is for their feed. 
In this connection it is well, too, to consider that the court 
has permitted intervener the right to graze and trail its 
sheep along a 3000 feet trail, and then for some reason, we 
assume only known to the court, he permits the intervener 
the right to trail its sheep only across Sections 3 6 and 2, 
aforesaid; as these are adjoining sections we speculate as 
to how the court expects the sheep of intervener, un-
numbered in quantity and up to as many as it should desire, 
to trail across these two sections, two miles in width, with-
out grazing on the same. There is no evidence that would 
ever support such a use and it is interesting to note from 
the defendants' Exhibit 5 that in order to reach these two 
sections the interveners would have to take their animals 
entirely away from and depart from the Government trail 
which they would be permitted to follow, and would of 
necessity have to trespass upon public domain which they 
would not be permitted to do. 
There are very few cases wherein a profit a prendre 
by prescription is discussed in this country. At common 
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law there is no principle more clearly established than that 
the public cannot acquire a profit a prendre by prescrip-
tion. It is likewise well established that a profit a prendre 
must be attached to a dominant estate. This requires real 
estate and it cannot attach to personalty. The nearest 
realty owned by the interveners is that at Timpie Point. 
That land is not adjacent to the lands of the plaintiff and 
is several miles to the east and north of any lands herein 
involved and is separated by a mountain range. Other 
than this one piece of land the other lands of intervener 
are 13 0 to 200 miles east and west of plaintiff's lands herein 
involved. There is nothing in the pleadings, findings or 
decree setting forth that this profit is appurtenant to any 
of the lands of the intervener. There is nothing in the 
evidence to ever support any such claim. In the case of 
John Waters vs. David Lilly, 4 Pick. (21 Mass.) 145, 16 
Am. Dec. 3 3 3, one who had a reservoir or lake entirely 
located upon his lands was held to have an exclusive right 
to fish thereon and any person entering thereon to take 
fish was held to be a trespasser. This trespasser, the de-
fendant, claimed that he had a profit a prendre to enter 
upon the water and take fish. At page 148 the court says: 
HI£ such a right is available at all it must be set 
up by prescription as belonging to some estate, and 
should be pleaded with a que esta'te." 
In that case the court rejected the evidence offered by 
the defendant of a custom for all of the inhabitants to 
take fish from the pond. The profit a prendre, as the court 
indicates, is a private easement and would be destroyed 
where it is shown that any right claimed is as a right of 
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above authority all of the cases cited under our Point No. II 
clearly hold that in unenclosed property surrounded by 
the public domain, any use is deemed to be permissive, and 
whereas the evidence shows that the intervener and its 
predecessors were trailing through this country at the rate 
of several miles per day, where their course varied from 
year to year and as the sheep would wander, there could 
never have been established any use of this land as a claim 
of right, and that the same law applies here as under our 
Point No. II. 
We further submit that neither Judge Ellett nor the 
interveners knew what they were after because the Judge 
describes, as heretofore quoted, the right acquired as a 
profit to prendre to feed off and graze the lands, which 
type of easement would be assignable, and then at the 
same time in his decree, in his findings and in the amend-
ment submitted by the interveners they describe an ease-
ment in gross. If the right claimed, therefore, is an ease-
ment in gross it is a right that has been acquired only by 
the interveners, unattached to any realty and to be used 
only by the intervener. That right is not assignable. It 
cannot be enlarged upon or given to any other person. It 
cannot be a profit a prendre because a profit a prendre can 
be acquired only as a part of a dominant estate and the 
pleadings, the evidence, the findings and the decree do not 
support any such prescriptive easement as a part of a domi-
nant estate. As cited in Smith v. Dennedy, 194 N.W. 999: 
cc (An easement appurtenant is defined as an 
incorporeal right, which, as the term implies, is 
attached to and belongs to some greater or superior 
right; something annexed to another thing more 
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worthy which passes as incident to it. Easements 
appurtenant inhere in the land, concern the 
premises, and are necessary to the enjoyment there-
of. They are incapable of existence separate and 
apart from the particular messuage or land to which 
they are annexed, there being nothing for them 
to act upon. They are in the nature of covenants 
running with the land, attach to the land, to which 
they are appurtenant, and pass by deed of con-
veyance.' 19 C. J. 865. 
H (Under the rule that there can be no easement 
without a distinct dominant tenement, it is said 
that there can, in strictness, be no such thing as an 
easement in gross. But there is a class of rights 
which one may have in another's land without their 
being exercised in connection with the occupancy 
of other lands, and they are therefore called rights 
or easements in gross, and in such cases the burden 
rests upon one piece of land in favor of a person or 
an individual. The principal distinction between 
an easement proper, that is an easement appurten-
ant, and a right in gross is found in the fact that 
in the first there is and in the second there is not a 
dominant tenement.' 19 C. J. 866." 
Under the principle of laws announced above, we 
would urge upon this court that under a fact situation as ;m 
involved in this case, where the intervener is covering a 1r1 
distance of 300 miles in trailing from its lands in Wyoming 001 
to its lands in Nevada, travelling public roads entirely in M 
making that trail, that the occasional wandering of sheep ~~ 
will not be recognized by this court as creating an easement, w11 
whether appurtenant or gross. We submit that under the r~1 
rule announced any intermittent wandering upon unen- ~ 
closed private lands within the public domain could not ~tl 
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create an easement by prescription because there is no dom-
inant estate to which it could be appurtenant or attached. 
The claimed trail which the court has given the intervener 
as a prescriptive easement neither terminates nor com-
mences on any lands of the intervener. It is nothing more 
than a general course along our established public highways 
which the testimony shows their wagons never left. In 
Volume 28, C.J.S., at page 639, it is stated: 
(CAn essential feature of a right of way ap-
purtenant has been held to be that it must have one 
of its termini on the land to which it is claimed to 
be appurtenant, and it has been held that if it has 
neither of its termini on the premises of the owner 
and is not appurtenant to any estate it is a right of 
way in gross, but there is authority to the contrary." 
The question necessarily arises, because of the pleadings and 
the decree establishing the rights of intervener to be an 
easement in gross, as to whether this court should recognize 
as an easement in gross the varying wanderings of sheep 
as they are driven along a general course within close 
proximity and adjacent to the camp wagons which are 
following the established state and county road. There is 
no dispute in the evidence that the present county road 
constructed in the early twenties has been the only course 
travelled by the wagons of intervener as the herds went 
north and south through Skull Valley. Neff, Jensen, 
Palmer, Cannon, Sharp and all of defendants' witnesses 
have so testified as heretofore pointed out. Could the 
wanderings of the herd travelling along adjacent to such 
road over these unenclosed desert lands create a right which 
this court will recognize? We submit that any policy 
recognizing such a right is clearly contrary to any policy 
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or tradition of this western country, and we submit that 
as a matter of law it is not, as an easement in gross or a 
profit a prendre, such a use as this court will permit to be 
recognized. In other words, we submit that in this fact 
situation, wherein sheep are wandering from side to side on 
the road, over a course 300 miles long, the owner so trailing 
will not thereby be permitted to subject all the lands along 
that course to a claim of a profit a prendre and an ease-
ment in gross. Certainly, where there is a well established 
road along which these parties can follow, in which they 
in general are following, no other way over private lands 
will be recognized as a policy of this State. Certainly, 
where lands are available for their forage and where the 
private lands represent only 5% of the public domain, our 
court will recognize no right other than such public road as 
is established according to Ia w. Any other policy will mean 
the confiscation of thousands of acres of land in the open 
country of this State, and remove these lands from the tax 
rolls of the State. 
POINT NO. V 
LAND THE TITLE TO WHICH WAS IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND BEING PURCHASED 
UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE STATE OF 
UTAH BY JEREMY AND LEASED FROM JERE-
MY BY THE DESERET LIVESTOCK COMPANY 
COULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A PRESCRIP-
TIVE EASEMENT. 
Paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact is to the effect 
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are being purchased from the State of Utah by E. J. 
Jeremy. As appears at Page 594 of the transcript, this con-
tract was first entered into September 26, 1924, and was 
cancelled May 1, I935. On August 22, 1935, that con-
tract was reinstated and carries No. 22246. 
At Page 594 of the transcript, and likewise in Para-
graph 13 of the Findings, it is further made to appear that 
under a contract with E. J. Jeremy the State of Utah sold 
to E. J. Jeremy the North half of the Southeast Quarter 
of the Southwest Quarter of Section 2I, Township I South, 
Range 7 West; the East Half of the East Half of Section 
20, and the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
of Section 29, Township I South, Range 7 West. The find-
ing of the Court in Paragraph I3 that this contract was 
dated March 7, I925, is not supported by the evidence. 
Such a date was never introduced in evidence at the trial. 
It does appear that the contract was cancelled May I, I936, 
and reinstated May 7, I936. 
Under another contract which had been paid, and for 
which patent had issued, but the date of the contract never 
having been introduced in evidence, the following land 
was deeded to E. J. Jeremy by the State of Utah February 
1, 1946. That patent covered the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 29, the Southeast Quarter 
of the Southeast Quarter of Section 31, all in Township 1 
South, Range 7 West; and it also covered Lot 1, Section 6, 
Township 2 South, Range 7 West. 
All of the lands, therefore, of the plaintiff involved in 
the complaint and lying in Township 1 South, Range 7 
\Vest, and involving the first four miles south of Timpie 
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Point, are leased by the plaintiff from E. J. Jeremy. The 
date of the lease from Jeremy was never introduced into 
the evidence at the trial of this case. Of the land leased, the 
only evidence in the record as to the date of any contract 
of purchase from the State is that covering Sections 16 and 
32, Township 1 South, Range 7 West, which is dated 
September 26, 1924, and on which patent has never issued. 
As to the property covered by patent, the evidence 
shows that patent was issued February 1, 1946. As to the 
other lands involved in the lease from Jeremy, the only 
date in the evidence is that of the cancellation of the con-
tract under date of May 1, 1936, and the reinstatement 
of the contract May 7, 1936. 
There is one principle of law that must be conceded ( 
and that is that a private prescriptive right could not be ,,. 
acquired against a lessor because of the acts of the lessee. 
There has never been in the testimony any claim of an 
assertion of right as against E. J. Jeremy. The date of the 
lease of these lands from Jeremy to the plaintiff corpora-
tion is not in evidence. At the outset, therefore, the record 
stands that whatever use has been made of the lands of 
E. J. Jeremy by the intervener and defendants, there is 
nothing in the evidence to show that they ever claimed 
such a right against E. J. Jeremy. There is nothing in the 
evidence to show that at any time he had any knowledge 
whatsoever that the intervener or defendants were on his 
property. 
The fact remains that the intervener corporation, by 
the testimony of its manager Samuel Neff, covering the 
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period of the intervener's incorporation from 1921 to 
1926, when Neff left the company, is to the effect that 
Neff or the intervener corporation never talked with or 
was questioned by anyone at any time over the use of any 
of the land in Skull Valley. The record does not show at 
any time that Jeremy had any knowledge whatsoever of 
of any trespass on his lands. There is no testimony that 
E. J. Jeremy, during any prescriptive period initiated by 
the intervener corporation, was ever in Skull Valley, or had 
any reason to know where, how or when intervener was 
operating its sheep as it proceeded from Wyoming to the 
Valley twice a year. Certainly there is no reason to believe 
they were claiming a strip 3000 feet in width across his 
lands as they went through Skull Valley. 
In 1 Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) , Page 
699, it is stated: 
HSince a tenant for years or for life cannot 
grant away the interest of the remainderman or 
reversioner, it is held that adverse user of a right 
over the land in possession of such tern porary holder 
does not create an easement that can prevail against 
the succeeding owner. Thus, where a right of way 
was claimed because of adverse use for time out of 
mind, over land possessed for most of the time by 
a tenant for ninety-nine years, whose lease had re-
cently expired, it was held that the claim was not 
effectual against the owner of the inheritance. How-
ever, an easement may be acquired against a lessee 
by grant which will be good against him for there-
mainder of his term. Accordingly, it has been held 
that neither at common law nor by the English 
Prescription Act can an easement by prescription 
be established against lessees of the crown, inasmuch 
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as the easement would not bind the reversion; and 
it has been held, too, that the user of a way adversely 
and under a claim of right for more than twenty 
years over land in the possession of a lessee who held 
under a lease for lives granted by the Bishop of 
Worcester gave no right as against the bishop, and 
did not affect the lessee. In such case, as the user 
could not give title as against all persons having 
estates in the land, it gave no title as against the 
lessee and persons claiming under him. No title 
was gained by a user which did not give a valid title 
as against the bishop and permanently affect the 
land." (Italics ours.) 
Further illustrating this point is Par. 458, Illustration 
7, Restatement of the Law, Vol. 5 on Property, where it 
is stated: 
((A has a life estate in Blackacre. B has a re-
mainder in fee. C, the owner of neighboring land, 
uses a way across Blackacre in connection with the 
use of his, C's land. C uses the way without consent 
being asked or given. C's use is wrongful as to A. 
B can show no such physical alteration of Blackacre 
by reason of the use as to cause harm to him in his 
future possession. The use is neither wrongful nor 
capable of being made by him wrongful as to him. 
C's use, while adverse to A, is not adverse to B." 
We have heretofore pointed out that property was 
leased to Deseret Livestock Company for the purpose of 
trailing and grazing its herds over the Jeremy land. The 
Livestock Company was operating four to five times as 
many herds as the intervener. The use of Deseret Live-
stock Company in having its herds cross the lands and hav-
ing its wagons make tracks through the country is a use to 
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be expected by Jeremy, and unless he was to be in Skull Val-
ley on one or two days, or fraction of days, at the time de-
fendants and intervener were taking their sheep through 
the country, he could have no knowledge of their acts. 
There will be nothing on the ground to evidence to him 
any different use of the property than that for which he 
had leased it. 
Under this principle announced in the Restatement, 
therefore, and the law as further cited above, there could 
be no prescriptive right asserted against the Deseret Live-
stock Company, because there could be no implied grant 
from the lessee, and there could be no right asserted 
against Jeremy because, as the evidence shows, there was 
nothing on the land or nothing in the evidence whatso-
ever to indicate that he had any knowledge of the use by 
intervener. 
We submit that the conclusive answer to any claim 
of a prescriptive right on these lands, title to which is still 
in the State of Utah and being purchased by Jeremy, and 
to the effect that intervener could have no easement over 
the same, is the following quotation from the case of 
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah, 57; 276 Pac. 912. At Page 74 
of the Utah Reports the Court states: 
ult may be conceded that plaintiff is supported 
by the authorities in his contention that an easement 
by prescription cannot be acquired over land be-
longing to the state or the United States, 19 C. J. 
Sees. 23, 24, p. 876, and cases cited in the footnote. 
Such has been declared to be the law in this jurisdic-
tion as applied to land belonging to the United 
States. * * ::- As to the land conveyed to plaintiff 
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by the state of Utah in 1913, obviously a prescrip-
tive easement could not be acquired up to 1922 
when this suit was begun." 
All of these lands in Skull Valley here involved are 
school lands, and in the case of Duchesne County v. State 
Tax Commission, 104 Utah, 365; 140 Pac. (2d) 335, at 
Page 370 of the Utah Report, the Court states: 
uDoes the state hold the estate school fund' 
whether represented by land or money, in its own 
right, or merely as trustee of an express trust?" 
On Page 371 it states: 
ult must follow that the state holds the cfund' 
as a trustee of an express trust, limited in the 
amount, that can be expended, and the purposes and 
uses thereof." 
In view of this declaration the authorities are numer-
ous to the effect that the State could do nothing to permit 
the title of the trust to be impaired in any way. It is under 
this theory that, whether the land is held by the State or 
whether the land is being sold under contract, no prescrip-
tive right to impair the title of the State can be created, 
and no prescriptive right can be initiated until title has 
passed from the State. 
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YEARS COULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A PRE-
SCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. 
In the map enclosed in this brief we have outlined the 
fee lands of plaintiff which the Court has subjected to the 
easement of intervener. These lands particularly are located 
in Section 36, T. 2 S. R. 8 W; Section 2, T. 3 S. R. 8 W.; 
Section 6, T. 2 S. R. 7 W. and Sections 29 and 31, T. 1 S. 
R.7W. 
We submit that as patent had issued on these lands for 
less than twenty years prior to the commencement of this 
action, as a matter of law there had not been twenty years 
adverse use which could have arisen against these lands. 
The evidence stands as we have heretofore pointed out 
upon a stipulation between counsel submitted to the Court 
that Deseret Livestock Company owns all of these lands set 
out in the complaint, subject only to the easements provided 
in the patents. Other than this stipulation the date of 
the acquisition of the various lands by the Deseret Live-
stock Company is made to appear only as there was pro-
duced in evidence the various patents. These patents were 
introduced by defendants. Defendants' Exhibit 10 shows 
that Deseret Livestock Company acquired title to Section 
36, Township 2 South, Range 8 West on the 9th day of 
May, 1938. Defendants' Exhibit 11 shows that Deseret 
Livestock Company received title to Section 2 Township 
3 South, Range 8 West by patent from the State of Utah 
on the 9th day of May, 1938. 
We have heretofore quoted from the case of Tripp v. 
Bagley, supra, to the effect that a prescriptive right of 
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twenty years could not have run against these lands because 
patent had not issued until1938, and the prescriptive period 
commenced at that time, which meant that the prescrip-
tive period had continued for not over nine years as of the 
date of the filing of the complaint, conceding there had 
been a use. The proposition is well established that a pre-
scriptive right cannot be acquired against lands of the 
United States and the State of Utah. We have heretofore 
cited numerous cases to that effect, and conclusive is the 
following from Page 643 of 28 C. J. Sec., wherein it is 
stated: 
((An easement by prescription cannot be ac-
quired against the government nor against a sub-
division thereof, such as a county, as to property 
held for the public." 
POINT NO. VII 
THE INTERVENER COULD NOT BY LEASE 
OR ASSIGNMENT TO THE SHARPS PERMIT 
THEM TO USE OR ACQUIRE ANY EASEMENT 
IN GROSS IN FAVOR OF INTERVENER, AND 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
TRESPASS AS TO THE DEFENDANTS SHARP. 
The evidence shows that David Howells died in or 
about the year 1938, and at the time of his death the de-
fendant Ira Sharp and his wife formed a partnership for 
the purpose of operating the sheep of the partnership. 
There is no doubt about the fact that the sheep of defend-
ants Sharp trespassed upon the lands of plaintiff, and de-
fendants have attempted to justify this trespass upon the 
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fact that Sharp was leasing lands of intervener, and that 
as to each sheep there was one leg that belonged to inter-
vener, and thereby the other three legs of the sheep for 
some reason would be privileged, even though they be-
longed to Sharp. 
The details of the transaction between Ira Sharp and 
his wife Lois Cannon Sharp and the intervener, if in 
writing were never presented in evidence. Mrs. Sharp is 
the sister of Mrs. Howells, the widow of David Howells, 
who was the owner of all of the stock of intervener. There 
is in evidence, however, the lease of the lands of intervener 
to Sharps. The interest of the Sharps in the operation of 
the sheep appears only by the oral testimony and at Page 
380 of the record Sharp states he has a joint venture with 
them. On Page 3 81 defendants' counsel asked Sharp: 
uQ. Now, Mr. Sharp, in the actual operation 
of the livestock of these two companies that you 
have mentioned, now do you run your sheep in 
separate heads or are the sheep of one company 
mixed with the sheep of the other? 
A. They are mixed with-they are run jointly 
and mixed." 
Mr. Clyde asked Sharp at Page 3 81 of the transcript: 
uQ. Do you each of you own a part of each 
sheep? 
Plaintiff's objection was overruled and the answer 
ndJ was: uy own 37% of the company; Mrs. Sharp owns 37% ~ 
of the company and the Howells Livestock, Inc. owns 
IBl 26% of the company, or livestock, I should say." 
I~ 
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At Page 414 of the transcript Sharp was asked the 
question on cross-examination: 
HQ. Now, these sheep that you got, did you 
buy some sheep yourself in 19 3 7? 
A. I bought the sheep in 1939. 
Q. Did you get a bill of sale with the sheep 
in 1939? 
A. I did. 
Q. That was in your name? 
A. My name and my wife's name. 
Q. And then in 1939, for the first time, you 
began an operation for yourself? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And were you in any way combining your 
sheep with any one else's sheep in 1939? 
A. Was I combining my sheep with anyone 
else's? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I combined them in joint venture with 
the Howells Livestock, Inc. 
Q. You got the bill of sale and you got title 
to a certain number of sheep? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Described by age and so on? 
A. That is correct. 
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Q. You can answer that yes or no, can't you? 
A. State the question. 
(Reporter read the question.) 
uA. Yes, I owned a certain percentage of the 
sheep. 
Q. Did your bill of sale read a percentage or 
a certain number? 
A. It read a certain number." 
We submit that there can be no other construction of 
this testimony than that Sharp and his wife received title 
to a certain number of sheep. These sheep represented 74% 
of the number of sheep owned by intervener in 19 3 9. 
There can be no other construction than that the intervener 
sold a number of sheep representing 7 4% of its herd in 
this transaction. If the number be 11,000, therefore, the 
defendants Ira Sharp and Lois Cannon Sharp have received 
title by bill of sale to 8140 sheep from intervener, so that 
at the time the trespass took place, 8140 of the sheep be-
longed to defendants and 2860 belonged to intervener. 
The sheep were commingled in the joint venture, and for 
the right to use all of the lands of intervener the intervener 
received 26% of all earnings of the venture. 
In this argument we submit that Finding No. 6 is 
entirely contrary to the evidence and the law, wherein 
the Court found that Ira Sharp and Lois C. Sharp owned 
74% of each particular sheep and Howells Livetsock Com-
, pany, Inc., owns 26% of each particular sheep. Our 
I 
quotations from the evidence and this matter clearly il-
lustrate the error of the Court in so attempting to find. 
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If intervener has acquired, as alleged and found by 
the Court, an easement in gross to graze and trail its sheep 
across the lands of plaintiff, then intervener cannot assign 
that right because as a matter of law an easement in gross 
is not assignable. It is personal only to the intervener. 
1 Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) at Page 
559 states: 
((An easement in gross is considered unassignable 
and uninheritable. It is a mere personal interest in 
the land of another; and it is so exclusively per-
sonal that the owner of the right can not permit 
another person to enjoy it with him. An easement 
in gross can not be made assignable or inheritable 
by any words in the deed by which it was granted. 
It is attached to the person to whom it is granted 
and cannot exist except as so attached." 
At Page 5 60 it is stated: 
ttAn easement is personal when it is expressly 
or by implication limited to the life of the person 
who is to enjoy it." 
As the easement in this case is not by the Court made 
appurtenant to any land but is held by the Court to be one 
in gross, it must be conceded that this easement is personal 
to the intervener. · 
Ira Sharp and Lois C. Sharp, as to their 8140 sheep, 
were trespassing and had no right to be on the land, and 
could not by assignment or their joint venture go upon 
these lands upon a claim of easement, because the law 
refuses to recognize any attempt on the part of the holder 
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' of an easement in gross to enlarge upon it or to assign it 
or permit any other person to use it. 
A judgment for trespass should have been granted 
against the defendants Sharp, for the history of their opera-
tions commences only in 1939. We submit, therefore, that 
by the attempt to enlarge upon the easement in gross by 
assigning the same to Sharp, the intervener has thereby 
lost any right it may have by way of an easement in gross, 
for the legal reason that the attempt to dispose by assign-
ment, lease or otherwise of that right in law extinguishes 
that right. 
In the case of Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal. App. 554; 
229 Pac. 1002, at Page 1007 the question is presented as to 
whether a roadway privilege was appurtenant to property 
or was one in gross and personal to Moffat. The Court 
said: 
((The question is important, for if the ease-
ment was appurtenant it passed to respondent as an 
incident to the land conveyed to him; whereas, if it 
was personal to Moffat, it ceased to exist when the 
latter deeded the property to Caldwell; for ease-
ments in gross (strictly speaking they are not ease-
ments) are not assignable or inheritable, and they 
cannot be made so by any terms in the grant." 
On page 2 of the Intervener's notice and motion to 
. amend complaint in intervention and to reopen case to 
' ~show survey of road, the following amendment to the 
i 'complaint in intervention is made by intervener: 
' I 
((That by said use of said property and the graz-
ing of said forage, the intervener has acquired an 
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easement in gross to trail across said property and 
the right to graze 14,000 of his sheep on said prop-
erty while trailing across it, between said new coun-
ty road and said foothills on the east thereof, from 
said Tim pie Point to said Iosepa Ranch." (Emphasis 
added.) 
We desire again to call the court's attention to the 
statement of Judge Ellett at page 599 of the transcript, 
wherein he stated: 
((They proved- I mean a private profit a 
pendre across there, an easement in gross." 
In the decree the court merely states that the inter-
vener has a prescriptive right to trail and graze sheep over 
the various courses. In the decree, however, there is no 
provision that the prescriptive right is appurtenant to any 
other land, and no place in the findings does it appear that ' 
the prescription is appurtenant and the conclusions do not 
mention this matter. The judge, however, had at all times 
indicated that he viewed the right as a personal right ac-
quired only by the acts of the intervener and, as indicated 1 
above, the intervener has by its own pleading, in which it 
denominates its right as an easement in gross, so limited 
and defined any right that they have. Conclusive of this 
fact is the case of Evans vs. Shand, 74 Utah 451, 280 Pac. 
239, where at page 240 this court says: I 
ccThe appellant in her reply disputes this and 
asserts that the respondent is bound by the theory 
of his allegations and of the findings that may not 
now, on appeal from the judgment founded there-
on, depart therefrom. We think the contention is 
I 
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well founded. The rule is well settled that on appeal 
the parties are restricted to the theory on which the 
case was prosecuted or defended in the court below." 
This policy has been sustained in so many cases that we 
submit that it does not require further authority. 
In the Utah case of Ernst vs. Allen, 55 Utah 272, 
184 Pac. 827, this court, at page 277, states: 
HAn easement appurtenant, sometimes called 
an easement proper, has been defined as follows: An 
easement proper is a privilege which the owner of 
one tenement has the right to enjoy in respect to 
that tenement, in or over the tenement of another 
person." 
Again, the same authority 1n speaking of essential 
elements states: 
ttThe existence of an easement involves the 
idea of two distinct tenements, a dominant estate 
to which the right is accessorial and a servient 
estate upon which it is a burden or charge. An 
easement in gross is defined by the same authority 
at page 2311 as follows: tAn easement in gross is 
the mere personal interest in the real estate of an-
other and is not assignable or inheritable. It dies 
with the person and it is so exclusively personal that 
the owner by right cannot take another person in 
company with him.' The principal distinction be-
tween the two classes of easements seems to be that 
in the easement appurtenant there must be a domi-
nant tenement, while no such element exists in an 
easement in gross." (Emphasis added) 
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In 130 A. L. R., at page 1254, the rule is stated as 
follows: 
uit may be laid down as a general rule that in 
the absence of something in the instrument creating 
the easement indicating a contrary intention, an 
easement in gross is a right personal to the one to 
whom it is granted and cannot be assigned or other-
wise transmitted by him to another." 
The authority for this statement is supported by cases from 
2 5 jurisdictions. 
At page 1255 of the same volume of A. L. R., quoting 
\V ashburn, Easements, 4th Edition, page 11, it is said: 
uA man may have a way in gross over another's 
land, but it must from its nature be a personal right, 
not assignable nor inheritable." 
In conclusion, on this argument we submit that the 
intervener could not by lease or assignment give any rights 
to the defendants and that the court erred in dismissing 
the trespass as to the defendants Sharp. 
POINT NO. VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ATTEMPT BY ITS 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT TO ESTABLISH 
TITLE IN INTERVENER TO LANDS IN THREE 
STATES AND V ARlO US COUNTIES AND PER-
MITTING A TACKING TO ESTABLISH AN 
EASEMENT IN GROSS AS SUCH A RIGHT, 
CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED BY A TRANS-
FER OF LAND. 
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As pointed out in our argument in Point No. 7, the 
court has not at any time found that any trail or road in 
Skull Valley was appurtenant to any of the lands of the 
intervener. We have heretofore pointed out the fact that 
Judge Ellett stated that the right acquired was personal 
to intervener and an easement in gross and was acquired 
by the acts of the intervet?-er only. In Finding No. 2 
the court finds title to certain lands in Juab County to be 
in the intervener. In Finding No. 3 the court finds Howell 
Livestock, Inc., the intervener, to be the owner of certain 
lands at the northern tip of the Stansbury Ranch several 
miles distant from the purported trail. In Finding No. 4 
the court finds the intervener to be the owner of real pro-
perty in Wyoming and in Summit County, Utah. We 
submit that such finding is entirely immaterial and without 
basis as far as the issues involved in this case are concerned. 
This difficulty clouds the entire issue in this case and like-
wise makes indefinite and uncertain and clouds and further 
encumbers the lands of the plaintiff. It is inconceivable 
that a transfer of lands in Wyoming or Summit County, 
Utah, will carry with it as an easement appurtenant lands 
in Tooele County, Utah. It is likewise inconceivable that 
a transfer of lands in Juab County, Utah, will carry with 
it as an easement appurtenant a right of way in Skull 
Valley. In each instance the eastern Utah and Wyoming 
lands and the western Utah and Nevada lands are separated 
from the claimed easement in Tooele by a distance of at 
least 150 miles. The question will always remain whether a 
transfer, therefore, of any particular part of any of these 
lands could be claimed to transfer a portion of the right of 
way. We submit that the fallacy of any such a claim be-
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comes apparent upon the mere recital of the facts. The said 
argument must of necessity be true of the lands of inter-
vener at what is called their Timpie Ranch at the Northern 
point of the Stansbury Ranch. The lands of intervener 
at Timpie are separated by a mountain range and several 
miles of intervening land from the nearest point of the 
claimed easement over the lands leased by the plaintiff. 
We submit, therefore, at the outset that the finding 
of the court as to the lands owned by the intervener are 
entirely immaterial and as an attempt to establish a right 
in an easement appurtenant must fail and as a right to 
establish a tacking of adverse use for the benefit of inter-
vener must likewise fail. It is therefore cited in the case 
of Ernst v. Allen, 55 Ut. 272, 184 Pac. 827. Our Supreme 
Court states at Page 277 of the Utah Report: 
H (The existance of an easement involves the 
idea of two distinct tenements; a dominent estate,\ 
to which the right is accessorial; and a servient 
estate upon which it is a burden or charge.' " 
H cAn easement in gross is a mere personal inter-
est in the real estate of another, and is not assign-
able or inheritable. It dies with the person, and it 
is so exclusively personal tha.t the owner by right 
cannot take another person in company with him.'" 
(Emphasis added) 
HThe principal distinction between the two 
classes of easements seems to be that in the easement 
appurtenant there must be a dominant tenement, 
while no such element exists in an easement in 
gross." 
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We submit, therefore, that the court erred in failing 
to determine by its decree the nature of the easement it was 
granting to the intervener, in failing definitely to describe 
it either as an easement in gross or an easement appurtenant. 
We submit that the finding establishing intervener and 
its predecessors as the owner of certain lands would lend 
support to a subsequent argument that the court had 
interpreted the right as being one appurtenant to the lands 
described. Such finding would lend further to the claim 
that the intervener was entitled to tack the acts of others 
who had owned such lands upon such use as made by the 
intervener. Both such claims must fail in view of the plead-
ings and the determination of the court as stated by it in the 
record and by the actual facts and law to the effect that any 
claim of intervener must be that of an easement in gross 
personal-to intervener and not appurtenant to any lands. 
We submit that plaintiff is entitled to have this matter clari-
fied where the entire value of its lands are confiscated for 
the purpose of such easement. Certainly we should know if 
our lands are to be confiscated whether that right is one that 
can be assigned or must terminate with the use of the inter-
vener. Certainly we are entitled to know whether it is such a 
right as can be shared by the intervener with others by as-
signment, joint venture or lease. 
In the case of Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, 23 
Ad. 20, 14 L. R. A. 300, the court at Page 21 states: 
uAn easement in gross is a mere personal in-
terest in the real estate of another and is not as-
signable or inheritable Washb. Easem. (4th Ed.) 
12. Chancellor Kent, in speaking of such an ease-
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ment, says: (It dies with the person, and it is so 
exclusively personal that the owner of the right can-
not take another person in company with him.'" 
Again at Page 22 of this same case, the court states: 
(( (A man may have a way in gross over an-
other's land, but it must from its nature be a per-
sonal right, not assignable nor inheritable;' .... We 
think the greater weight of the authorities supports 
the doctrine announced, that easements in gross, 
properly so called, are not assignable or inheritable." 
The court has found that the intervener had no right 
to the use of the water of Burnt Springs by way of appro-
priation. Our law of appropriation has established certain 
facts. One is to the effect that an appropriator cannot 
initiate his right to appropriate water by trespass on the 
lands of another. As the intervener had no right to the 
water themselves, it could not be contended that he had 
an easement in gross to go on the lands of plaintiff for the 
purpose of taking waters from the spring. This because 
one cannot initiate an appropriation of water by prescrip-
tion. The only way this right could arrive in this case is 
by way of adverse possession of a right of appropriation 
of the plaintiffs. There is no evidence or finding to support 
such an issue in this case. We submit, therefore, that 
the provisions of the decree adjudging the intervener to 
have established a right by prescription to water its sheep 
at Burnt Springs is contrary to the pleadings, evidence, the 
findings and the law in that it does not limit them to water-
ing in any event in the spring and fall as they trail through. 
Second, that the right cannot be determined as to whether 
it is an easement in gross or an easement appurtenant by 
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reason of the inclusion of the lands in the findings. In other 
words it cannot be determined as to whether the easement 
was created solely by the acts of the intervener and as one in 
gross or appurtenant. In view of the two rights, therefore, 
in one of the trail and the one of the easement at Burnt 
Springs. We submit that the decree is so indefinite, that, 
as a matter of law it must fail. 
POINT NO. IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING INTER-
VENER TO SURVEY AND INTRODUCE IN 
EVIDENCE A SURVEY OF A PURPORTED 
ROAD AFTER THE CASE HAD BEEN TRIED 
AND SUBMITTED AND WHICH SURVEY 
DOES NOT FOLLOW ANY COURSE TESTI-
FIED TO BY ANY WITNESSES IN THE TRIAL 
OF THE CASE. 
During the course of the trial, Judge Ellett and the 
' attorneys for all of the parties went out to view the pre-
. mises. This was after the testimony given by most of inter-
veners' and defendants' witnesses, and it will be noted in 
:the transcript at Page 522 wherein Mr. Clyde was asking 
·to have the road surveyed as described by the witnesses. 
1 :the court stated: 
UTHE COURT: 
ccThe difficulty with that is going to be this, 
that if your surveying a straight line through and 
take all of these witnesses out there, I may have 
everyone of them disagreeing at some point with 
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that trail. If I give you a trail I ought to do it on 
the theory that I find where it goes and the witnesses 
may let me down. Wherever I survey one, they 
will say, (It isn't here. It was down there.' " 
This, we submit, results in the obvious proposition that 
the court was determining a roadway through Skull Valley, 
which roadway was not supported by the evidence even 
according to the courts own statement. Further it is not 
supported by the evidence according to the testimony of 
Mr. Clyde, who had this road surveyed. 
After the case had been concluded and both parties 
rested, the intervener then went out by counsel, Mr. Clyde, 
and surveyed the course over which Judge Ellett was sup-
posed to have walked 2 Yz months before. On October 21st, 
several months after the conclusion of the trial, the inter-
vener moved the court to admit into evidence this survey. : 
(Tr. 597) This survey was admitted by the court over 
the objections of the plaintiff upon the ground and for the 
reason that the case had been tried under a theory of a 
public easement going across these lands, and this was evi- ~ 
dence to show a private easement and further that this 
was the first time in the proceedings that any description 
of the land intended to be covered by the prescriptive right 
was shown. 
During the trial the witnesses for the defendants and 
interveners marked on Defendants Exhibit No.5 (an aerial 
photograph of the area) the place where they claimed 
the road ran through the area. This same road was sup-
posed to be indicated by dotted lines on Exhibit C of the 
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intervener's complaint. Mr. Clyde was put on the witness 
stand to testify as to this survey of the road found by the 
court upon viewing the premises and testified as follows: 
uQ But the Dotted line was also to follow the 
road as indicated on the aerial photograph? 
A. My understanding is that that dotted line 
was the road he marked with x's and circles on the 
aerial photograph map, yes sir. 
Q. Do you know wheather the road as it ap-
peared on the aerial map is the road that you had 
surveyed? 
A. I know that it isn't in its total." 
The evidence of any roadway or trail as was submitted by 
the interveners and defendants was limited to the aerial 
photograph and the witnesses identification of it on the 
aerial photograph. We submit that the tryer of the fact 
has it within his power to go out and examine the premises 
to give him a better understanding of the testimony of 
the witnesses. Redd v. Airway Motor Corporation Lines, 
Inc., 104 Ut. 9, 137 Pac (2d) 374. For a Utah case uphold-
ing the proposition that the view taken by the jury is not 
for the purpose of taking independent testimony, see T. A. 
Sorenson Co. v. Denver & Rio GrandeR. R. Co., 49 Ut. 
548, at Page 553, 164 Pac. 1020. Our position in regard 
to this is that the court cannot by merely viewing the pre-
mises determine which of the many roads and trails and 
tracks through that valley was used for a period in excess 
of twenty years. The only way that this prescriptive use 
1 
can be determined in this case, is by the testimony of the 
1 
witnesses themselves. No witness identified any such 
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road as existing at the time of the trial. No witness stated 
which of many tracks it might be. The course the court 
followed is entirely different than that pleaded by inter-
vener and proved by them during the trial as the one 
they claimed and had used. This road as found by the 
Judge in viewing the premises is entirely contrary to the 
law and the evidence in the case, and the survey should 
not have been admitted in evidence. 
All of the testimony of the intervener and defendants 
was to the effect that if there was any claim through this 
valley, it was marked on Exhibit 5 and according to Mr. 
Clyde's own testimony the dotted line on Exhibit C of the 
Complaint in Intervention was supposed to represent the 
trail testified to by the witnesses of the interveners and 
when Mr. Clyde was asked whether or not the trail surveyed 
is the same one testified to he says, eel know that it isn't 
in its total." (Tr. 606.) 
With the introduction of this survey it was the first : 
time that any claimed way by the defendants and inter- : 
vener was identified by metes and bounds. In the very 
beginning of the proceedings the plaintiff objected to the 
fact that the complaint did not identify the route claimed. 
This objection was raised by special demurrer and the de-
murrer was stricken by the court. Thus throughout the 
trial the plaintiff was not able to ascertain what road or 
where the road went which was claimed by the intervener 
and defendants. Reference was made to a line on the aerial 
photo by some of the witnesses who were not acquainted 
with the old road. Whereas others who had such a road in 
mind could not agree that was the road. This was the first 
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time that there had been any definite assertion to a road 
or trail by metes and bounds. It was not only the first 
time that there had been such a definition of the way but 
also it broadened the pleadings to include a profit a prendre. 
All during the trial the plaintiff had no opportunity to 
plead to any claim of profit a prendre, nor did the plaintiff 
have any opportunity to plead to the road as surveyed. 
There was no issue during the trial on a profit a prendre. 
The admission of this survey took place several months 
after the trial, and after both sides had rested. As we 
have heretofore indica ted this survey does not conform 
to the roadway claimed by the dotted line on Exhibit C 
to the complaint, nor is it the same as the one pointed to 
by the witnesses on the aerial photo. Certainly the plaintiff 
should have been given a chance to plead and submit evi-
dence upon the new roadway claimed at this late stage in 
the action. And likewise on the issue of the profit. Plaintiff 
objected to the introduction of this survey (Tr. 598-599) 
upon the grounds that it sought to establish a private 
trail, which had never been claimed before this in these 
proceedings, and also upon the grounds that it was the 
first time that any issue of a profit a prendre was claimed. 
Such objection should have been sustained since it raised 
entirely new material after the case had been tried. 
((An amendment improperly changing the 
cause of action may not be objected to by way of 
answer setting up such change as a defense, or by 
an allegation in the answer that the complaint was 
improperly filed; the proper remedy is by objection 
to the filing of the amendment, or by motion to 
strike the amended pleading from the files." 
1 Bancroft on Code Pleading, p. 758. 
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The inclusion of the issue of a profit a prendre was 
entirely new and foreign to the whole case. It had never 
been pleaded before and no issue or discussion of it was had 
at any point in the proceedings. To introduce the theory of 
a profit a prendre after the whole case had been tried and 
without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to meet such 
an issue violates one of the most cardinal principles of law. 
1 Bancroft on Code Pleading, p. 24, states: 
Hit must be noted that the theory of pleadings 
as affecting the statement of a cause of action or de-
fense is to be distinguished from a theory of the case 
adopted upon the trial. In the latter case the party 
adopting a theory is generally bound by it. Such 
a rule rests fundamentally in the principle that 
a plaintiff ·cannot allege one cause of action and 
recover upon another. To permit a recovery under 
such circumstances would be to license deception 
in pleading and violate the cardinal purposes of the 
law in requiring that the pleader state the cause of 
action or ground of defense (upon which he relies'" 
Again at page 788 we find: 
((Amendements made to the complaint after 
trial, and for the purpose of making it conform to 
the proof, must rest upon such proof, and cannot 
go beyond it, since they are not made for the purpose 
of framing issues for the trial, but to supply some 
technical defect, or, perhaps, upon the supposition 
that certain issues have been tried which are dif-
ferent from those framed by the pleadings." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus in the principal case, the survey of the road 
should not have been allowed because it did not conform 
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llat to any proof. There was no evidence as to the location 
K: of the road at the points surveyed. Reference was always 
:ll made to the aerial photo and Mr. Clyde himself admits 
4'r that the survey does not follow the road indicated on the 
::t: photo as we have heretofore pointed out. The only con-
te elusion that can be reached is that the court should have 
tt~~ sustained the objection, to the introduction of the survey 
:~: 
and amended pleadings and new issue. 
POINT NO. X 
THE COURT ERRED IN DECREEING THAT 
THE WATERS OF BURNT SPRINGS WERE 
PUBLIC AND SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 
AND THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO TITLE, AP-
PROPRIATION OR OWNERSHIP TO THE 
WATERS OF THE SPRING FOR THE REASON 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NOT PUT IN ISSUE 
ITS TITLE TO THE WATERS, AND THE DE-
FENDANTS AND INTERVENERS IN THEIR 
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A RIGHT COULD 
NOT HAVE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT ADJUDI-
CATED. 
~:r:: An examination of plaintiff's complaint will not show 
~C~Jl' any claim on the part of the plaintiff to the waters of Burnt 
~~,~;Springs in this action. This was strictly an action by the 
~-::;r plaintiff to enjoin the trespassing of the defendants and 
:C::? to recover damages for the trespass and the matter of 
r:i6: plaintiff's right to the waters of Burnt Spring were never 
::r put in issue at the trial. The only way the question arose 
~:;-.::.as to the waters of Burnt Springs is through the complaint 
f ~in intervention and the cross complaint of the defendants 
0 
.. s~tting up that they have an appropriation right in the 
nor~· 
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waters of Burnt Springs. This, of course, was denied by 
the plaintiff but no affirmative issue was raised in the plead-
ings as to the plaintiff's right or title to the waters of 
Burnt Springs. Certainly nothing can be more basic in our 
law than that a decree of a court upon matters not put in 
issue by any of the pleadings is void and contrary to law. 
The case of Evans vs. Shand (Supra) at Page 240 of the 
Pacific Report, this court has said: 
((Whatever liberality may be accorded pro-
cedure, there nevertheless are certain fundamental 
principles, which cannot be disregarded. These, 
among others, are that pleadings are the juridicial 
means to invest the court with subject matter juris-
diction and to limit issues and to renew proofs; 
that courts cannot make a complaint for one thing, 1 
stand for a different thing; that recovery must 
be secundu1n allegata et probata, which is but 
a necessary deduction from the maxim that is 
not juridically presented cannot be judicially de-
cided; that the statement of the cause of action 
or ground or defense as laid binds the court as 
well as the parties; that there must be no departure , 
is but another statement of the maxim that it I 
is vain to prove what is not alleged. These principles 
are primary." 
Thus, in the principal case, it will be observed that 
the plaintiff's right and title to the waters of Burnt Springs: 
were never put in issue. Finding No. 29 of the court' 
finds that the plaintiff has not established any right what-
soever to the use of the waters at Burnt Springs, except as 
a member of the general public, and the plaintiff has never 
made any appropriation, either by diligence or by statu-
tory filing. That the waters of the springs were at the time 
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of filing this action, public waters and every member of 
the public had an equal right of use. Further in the 
decree of the court the court has stated uit is further 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the waters of Burnt 
Springs in Skull Valley, Tooele County, Utah, adjacent to 
the public road described above is surface stream, and that 
the waters thereof were at the time this action was com-
menced public unappropriated waters, and that the same 
were subject to public appropriation, and that the plaintiff 
has no special right, title, estate of interest therein by reason 
of the ownership of the lands upon which the springs arise 
or by reason of any diligence, right or statutory appro-
priation, and that all parties hereto at the time of the 
:filing of this action had equal rights to the use of the 
waters thereof as members of the general public." The 
defendants and interveners in their complaint and cross 
claim attempted to set up the title to the water of Burnt 
Springs in themselves and to quiet title to these waters in 
themselves. The most that the trial court could find is 
that if the defendants and interveners had any right the 
court could determine whether or not the plaintiff had 
any adverse right thereto but having found that the de-
fendants and interveners had no right to the waters, the 
court could then go on and find also that the plaintiff had 
no right. In the case of Home Qu;ners Loan Corporation 
v. Dudley, 105 Ut. 208, 141 Pac. (2d) 160, we have an 
action to quiet title to real property and this court has said 
at Page 218 of the Utah Report: 
((Plaintiff could prevail on a claim of record 
title only by showing good title in itself, not by-
showing some defects in the title of defendants." 
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To the same effect See Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Ut. 10, 
94 Pac. (2d) 862. 
I 
This court has held in the case of Logan, Hyde Park. 
a.nd Smithfield Canal Company v. Logan City, 72 Ut. 221- 1 
269, Pac. 776: 
HA right to use a definite quantity of water of 
a particular source is just as specific a thing in 
legal contemplation as an estate in land and the 
title to one is quieted in precisely the same manner 
as the other." 
We submit, therefore, that the court finding inter-
veners and defendants had not appropriated the waters, 
the title of Deseret Live Stock in and to the waters of 
Burnt Springs could not have been adjudicated in this mat-
ter, and it was clearly error and contrary to the law for the 
court to proceed to enter a decree adjucating plaintiff's 
rights in the waters when there was no issue in the pleadings 
to support such decree. 
POINT NO. XI 
THE COURT ERRED IN DECREEING THE 
RIGHT OF INTERVENER TO TRAIL AND 
GRAZE ITS SHEEP OVER ALL OF SECTION 36, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 8 WEST, AND 
SECTION 2, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 8 
WEST, AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUS-
TAIN ANY FINDING OR JUDGMENT OF 
SUCH EASEMENT. 
There is no evidence in the entire transcript that 
the defendants or interveners were ever upon Sections 2 
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· and 3 6 aforesaid, except on the occasion of the trespass 
in the year 1947. For this reason we have heretofore sub-
mitted in our argument and authorities under Point No. 2 
·that any attempt of the court to decree an easement over 
all of Sections 2 and 3 6 is entirely contrary to law and there 
is no evidence to support any findings or decree that the 
interveners or defendants had ever had their herds upon 
those two sections for any prescriptive period. We have 
likewise heretofore pointed out that these two sections 
were conveyed by the State of Utah to the plaintiff 
corporation in 1938, and that for this reason, as well as 
the reasons under Point 2, the court could not decree an 
easement to trail over all of these sections for the reason 
that the prescriptive period of twenty years could not 
have run since the lands were acquired from the state. 
Inasmuch as the court has attempted, however, to 
separate these two sections from all the other lands and 
specifically decree a right to trail over them, we desire 
herein to point out specifically to the court's attention 
the error of the district court in so doing. These two 
sections adjoin on the Southwest corner of Section 3 6 and 
the Northeast corner of Section 2. Together they would 
extend east and west for an area of two miles. We 
submit that in view of the fact that the prescriptive period 
could not have run and in view of the fact that there was 
no evidence that the interveners or defendants had ever 
been on the sections other than the year in which the tres-
pass was complained of in this proceeding, there was no 
authority nor justification in law or equity to support 
Judge Ellett's confiscating these lands from the plaintiff 
and turning them over to the defendants. 
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It is also interesting that the court has given to the 
interveners and defendants a right to graze and trail an 
area approximately 3 000 feet in width and then without 
evidence or pleadings, these two sections are selected and 
a right given to trail only over them. Nothing could more 
clearly evidence the literal application by Judge Ellett in 
this case of the scriptural admonition ((ask and ye shall 
receive." We suggest that the generosity of the court must 
be based, however, on sound legal principles, none of which ; 
can be found to support this decree. There was no evi-
dence, pleading or finding to support the judgment. 
Finding No. 13 that these two sections were purchased 
from the state of Utah by plaintiff in 1919 is not supported 
by the evidence. In our Point 6, we have detailed the 
only evidence on these two sections as contained in the 
patents introduced by defendants, which show patent 
issued in 19 3 8. There is nothing in evidence as to the 
title of these two sections other than the patents and the 
stipulation of counsel that plaintiff is the owner of the fee 
and entitled to possession other than for easements created 
by the patent. No evidence can be pointed to which will 
show any use of these two sections by the intervener. 
We submit that this court will never sustain the gift 
to intervener of 1280 acres of fee lands of the plaintiff. 
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:t: In conclusion we respectfully submit that this court 
~~ should enter its order reversing the district court and setting 
OU!C: aside its decree in its entirety, and that this court enter as 
;£t a final judgment a decree perpetually enjoining the inter-
:1> vener and the defendants from trespassing upon any and 
~i:· all of the lands of the plaintiff described in the complaint 
l~~ of the plaintiff, and awarding to the plaintiff judgment for 
iU damages for the trespass of defendants and intervener upon 
~the lands of the plaintiff. 
~puti! The country herein involved is open and unenclosed 
F~~· . 
; ·.,land. Stnce about 1920 Tooele County has constructed and 
~maintained through Tooele County a graded county road 
~~:located shortly east of and paralleling the old Lincoln High-
::c"i: way south through that desert area. The state and county 
::.~have furnished for approximately 30 years a maintained 
·-;.highway north and south for 150 miles, and extending over 
:~~into Nevada. The vehicles of all kinds, of the intervener 
.. ri:and of all of the public, have followed that main highway. 
- ... Over this entire course of 15 0 miles or more in Tooele -~;_>. 
- County the intervener and defendants have attempted to 
:riJ:secure for themselves the entire surface rights to lands, the 
::::.:fee title of a portion of which is owned by the plaintiff and 
- a portion of which is leased by plaintiff from the other fee 
owners. The intervener and defendants have attempted to 
justify the grazing and trailing privileges over these lands 
by the occasional and varied meanderings of their herds as 
they were driven north and south through this valley, not 
more than twice in any year. 
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For the reasons set forth in our brief, we sincerely 
submit to the court that there has been no evidence sub-
mitted to establish here an additional public road to the 
east of the old Lincoln Highway and to the east of the 
present main county highway, and there is no evidence to 
sustain a private easement for trailing, nor a profit a 
prendre to graze on the lands of plaintiff in that area. We 
have further conclusively presented to the court the fact 
that pleadings of the intervener and defendants were fatally I 
defective and cannot support either the public road, a profit 
a prendre or the easement to trail. Particularly have we· 
pointed out to the court that there was never at any time 1 
any easement in any way referred to or pleaded over any 
lands of the plaintiff in the Burnt Spring area. 
We submit further that on all of those lands where i 
the patent has not issued for twenty years, or where title : 
is still held by the state of Utah, there could be no prescrip- : 
tive right acquired because that period cannot commence' 
until the lands are conveyed from the state of Utah. The. 
attempt by the intervener to assign or lease their easement 1 
in gross to the defendants we submit has resulted in a loss ' 
of any easement that they may have had, and certainly 
could not convey any rights to the defendants, as such 
rights are not assignable nor can they be shared. The at-
tempt of the court to include in the :findings a description 
of lands in Nevada, Wyoming and eastern and western 
Utah further beclouds the rights decreed to the intervener 
and defendants in implying that the intervener and de-
fendants could tack the acts of others to create their rights,j 
whereas such is entirely contrary to law in these circum· 
stances. 
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We submit that the court erred in permttttng the 
intervener and defendants, over the objection of plaintiff, 
to amend their complaint after trial to include a profit a 
prendre, to include a private easement and to include a 
survey of a course the court chose, which course the court 
admitted would not be supported by the evidence, and this 
was prejudicial error requiring the reversal of the district 
court's judgment. 
We submit that the district court erred in attempting 
to decree and determine the rights of the plaintiff in and to 
the water of Burnt Spring when the only issue was the 
rights of the intervener and defendants to said waters, and 
this was likewise reversible error because there was no 
issue or pleading to support the decree of the court. 
Similarly, we submit as conclusive error on the part 
of the district court the decreeing to intervener and de-
fendants of a right to trail over all of Section 2, Township 
3 South, Range 8 West, and Section 36, Township 2 South, 
Range 8 West, inasmuch as the patent had not issued on 
said land until 1938 and there was no evidence whatsoever 
that the intervener or defendants or their animals had ever 
been upon any portion of these two sections. We submit 
:that the judgment of the district court is unreasonable and 
.unjust and inequitable in decreeing to the intervener all of 
the sole and only benefit provided by the 1280 acres in 
these two sections; i.e., the feed growing thereon, and 
that his lack of judgment and the necessity for the reversal 
of that judgment becomes obvious. The net effect of this 
decree is to actually cast upon the plaintiff the burden of 
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paying the taxes and maintaining the land and to give to 
the defendants a deed to the one and only use to which the 
land can be put. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN 
and RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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